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The Administrative Law 
of Global Private-Public 
Regulation: the Case of Forestry
Errol Meidinger*
Abstract
An important ensemble of transnational, transgovernmental regulatory institutions has
emerged in the forestry sector over the past decade. These ‘forest certification’ programmes
set global standards for proper forest management and apply them through institutionalized
licensing and inspection programmes. Similar programmes are appearing in other sectors.
Developed largely by environmental NGOs and industry associations rather than
governments, forest certification programmes are nominally voluntary, but are becoming
increasingly mandatory in practice. They are also gradually linking with government
regulatory and management programmes in various ways, while remaining in tension both
with each other and with government programmes. The overall regulatory system is thus
highly dynamic, as the programmes compete with each other for business and also with
government regulatory programmes for public acceptance. This paper describes and assesses
the administrative law – i.e., the requirements for rule-making and rule application – of the
emerging global forest regulatory system. It finds that while the certification programmes
are becoming increasingly transparent and participatory, often comparing favourably with
government programmes, some of them still need considerable improvement and all of them
face serious challenges. It concludes with a discussion of the problem of accountability,
* Professor and Vice Dean of Law for Research, Adjunct Professor of Sociology, State University of
New York at Buffalo, USA and Honorary Professor of Forestry and Environmental Science, University of
Freiburg, Germany. Email: eemeid@buffalo.edu. Paper prepared for the conference on ‘Global Adminis-
trative Law: National and International Accountability Mechanisms for Global Regulatory Governance,‘
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outlining the possibility that the programmes exemplify an emerging new kind of ‘learning
accountability’.
1 Introduction
Although few things would seem to be more local than trees, an extensive global sys-
tem of forestry regulation is under construction. Its main architects are not govern-
ments or intergovernmental organizations, although they occasionally perform
important tasks. Instead, transnational environmental organizations, in concert with
a small but growing number of business, labour, social justice, landowner and profes-
sional groups, have been the primary designers of emerging global forestry institu-
tions. These groups have established mutually interested alliances that cooperate and
compete with each other in complex and shifting ways, and that regularly engage in
reciprocal observation, communication, lobbying and policy adjustment with gov-
ernmental and intergovernmental agencies. The overall system of forestry regulation
is thus a multi-centred private/public one, which operates in a loosely coordinated
and sometimes disjointed fashion. One could therefore also legitimately call it a gov-
ernance system, since it articulates and adapts guiding norms through a system of
shared authority;1 or it could be called a regime, since it involves multiple institutions
operating in terms of common principles, rules, procedures and programmes.2 In
order to highlight the principles and rules governing these processes, however, this
paper treats the system as one of regulation, and indeed of regulatory law-making.3
This perspective also seems to be appropriate as an empirical matter, since much of
the system is concentrated on the development of general rules and their application
to categories of enterprises by specialized officials relying on normative justifications
and background threats of sanctions.4
For the past decade a major institutional focus of this emergent system has been
‘forest certification’, wherein experts certify to a broader public that specific forestry
1 See generally, A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler, and T. Porter (eds), Private Authority in International Affairs (1999);
J.N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics
(1992); Cashore, ‘Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority’, 15 Governance (2002) 503;
Burns, Drahos, and Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’, 30 Australian J Legal Philosophy (2005) 30.
2 Gulbrandsen, ‘Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the
Global Forest Regime?’, 4 Global Environmental Politics (2004) 75; Levy, Young, and Zürn, ‘The Study of
International Regimes’, 1 European J Int’l Relations (1995) 267.
3 I call it a ‘system’ because the various parts, although operating at different levels and sometimes with
different constituencies and goals, are dependent on and adapt to each other in ways that orient their
overall activity. This is different from the concept of a legal system as it is sometimes used to refer to a set
of rules and assumptions that are logically consistent with each other and perhaps derived from the
same source of authority. My concept of system is more akin to an ecological than to a logical or
mechanical one.
4 For a more detailed exposition of forest certification as a form of law making, see Meidinger, ‘Forest Certi-
fication as Environmental Law Making by Global Civil Society’, in E. Meidinger, C. Elliott, and G. Oesten
(eds), Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification (2003).
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operations meet applicable standards for proper forest management. Were it done by
governments, forest certification would readily be seen by legal scholars as adminis-
trative licensing or permitting and the larger system of policy-making and implemen-
tation as administrative regulation.5 Because forest certification is more fragmented
and decentralized than most government regulation, understanding it requires for-
saking simplistic source-of-law models for understanding administrative law.
Forest certification is also connected to parallel developments in other sectors,
including organic agriculture,6 fisheries,7 mining,8 coffee,9 and others, although it
appears to be a leading edge in many ways. This paper thus treats forest certification
both as an indicator of broader trends in the administrative law of global govern-
ance,10 and as a place from which to trace connections to other regulatory domains.
Focusing on the administrative law of forest certification is entirely apt not only from
an external perspective, but also from an internal one, because much of the system is
in fact defined and structured in terms of classical administrative law issues and prac-
tices. The next two subsections describe the historical emergence of the global for-
estry regulatory system and the primary actors involved in forest certification.
Sections 2 and 3 describe its rule-making and adjudicatory policies and practices.
Finally, Section 4 offers some preliminary assessments of the effectiveness, reliability
and accountability of the emerging global regulatory system. It suggests that forest
certification has triggered significant changes in forest management practices that
are likely to expand, that its reliance on certifiers paid by the firms being certified is
fragile, and that a new, partially inchoate accountability structure focused on mutu-
ally adjusting institutions and normative standards is emerging. Ultimately, if these
developments continue, they may demand a major rethinking of the basis of political
legitimacy in transnational regulation.
A Historical Context
The movement for forest certification grew out of the ‘tropical timber crisis’ of the
mid-1980s, when environmental organizations portrayed the rapid deforestation of
5 Indeed, corporate managers often refer to a ‘social licence to operate’, and forest certification may be one
effort to institutionalize such licences in forestry: see, e.g., Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, ‘Social
License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’, 29 Law and Social
Inquiry (2004) 307.
6 International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), available at http://
www.ifoam.org/.
7 Marine Stewardship Council, available at http://www.msc.org.
8 Mining Certification Evaluation Project, available at http://www.minerals.csiro.au/sd/SD_MCEP.htm.
9 The Global Partnership for Safe and Sustainable Agriculture has produced a coffee standard and is now
working on standards for fruits and vegetables, flowers and ornamentals, and aquaculture, available at
http://www.eurep.org/Languages/English/index_html.
10 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and Contem-
porary Problems (2005) 15. See also the Working Papers of the Global Administrative Law Project of the
Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law, available at
www.iilj.org. For an early effort to map the influence of emerging global issues and discourses on
domestic administrative law, see A.C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era (1992), at 131–156.
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tropical countries as a grave and gathering disaster. Although the causes of tropical
deforestation are multiple (including population growth, conversion of forests to
farming and other uses, infrastructure expansion, and fire11) and vary from case to
case, an important cause in many cases is consumption of tropical timber in
developed countries. The responsibility of Northern consumers combined with the
importance of Northern currency to developing countries prompted calls by some
environmental groups for a consumer boycott of tropical timber.12 Before long, how-
ever, this strategy was rejected as counter-productive, since it was seen as discrimina-
tory by developing countries and since the loss of Western revenues for developing
country forest products could lead to accelerated forest conversion and destruction.13
Replacing the tropical timber boycott were calls for a system by which timber from
sustainably managed forests could be certified and labelled as such, enabling con-
sumers to identify it in the marketplace. By purchasing only wood certified through
such a system, Northern consumers could avoid contributing to destructive forestry
and, better yet, reward good forestry. The original proposals called for a certification
system operated, or at least developed, by the International Tropical Timber Organi-
zation (ITTO),14 an intergovernmental organization of tropical timber producing and
consuming countries established in 1986 under the auspices of the United Nations.15
The ITTO resisted and eventually rejected those proposals, to the great consternation
of many environmental activists at the time.16
Other efforts to effectuate tropical forest protection also foundered, the most signi-
ficant being the failed push for a binding forest convention at the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio. But UNCED
performed the important function of strongly and broadly crystallizing the global dis-
course of ‘sustainable development’, which had been under development for the past
two decades. The concept of sustainable development that emerged conceives eco-
nomic development, environmental protection and social justice as inextricably
interlinked and mutually necessary. Most governments, North and South, have
embraced this concept, as have most social and environmental NGOs and business
organizations. Today it provides the organizing framework for virtually every trans-
national discussion of environmental policy. In the intergovernmental arena there
has been much work aimed at defining sustainable development and agreeing on
11 Brown, ‘Cut and Run? Evolving Institutions for Global Forest Governance’, 13 J Int’l Developments
(2001) 852.
12 A. Kolk, Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organisations, NGOs and the Brazilian
Amazon (1996). Particularly important were Friends of the Earth in the UK and the Rainforest Action
Network in the US: Bartley, ‘Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of
Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields’, 31 Politics & Society (2003) 433. These
organizations were also important players in the subsequent movement for forest certification.
13 Ibid.
14 C. Elliott, Forest Certification: A Policy Perspective (2000), at 5.
15 F. Gale, The Tropical Timber Trade Regime (1988).
16 Elliott, supra note 14; Gale, supra note 15.
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indicators of its achievement. But these inter-governmental efforts have had little
apparent impact on either state regulatory practices or tropical forest degradation.17
In the extra-governmental arena, a small group of environmental NGOs, timber
producers and wood processors sought to institutionalize sustainable development in
the form of a non-governmental forest certification system. In 1989 the Rainforest
Alliance, a US-based environmental NGO, created a free-standing forest certification
programme called SmartWood, which certified several timber operations as sustaina-
bly managed and authorized their products to carry its logo.18 In the fall of 1993 a
larger group led by the World Wildlife Fund, and including several other NGOs, small-
scale timber producers, high-end furniture makers, retailers (most notably the British
do-it-yourself company, B&Q), and individual forestry professionals, founded the For-
est Stewardship Council (FSC). The FSC was conceived from the outset as a global pro-
gramme for forest certification. Its primary functions would be to set standards for
certification and to accredit certification organizations like SmartWood.19 Products
certified under the FSC system would be entitled to carry the FSC logo.20
The FSC was constituted as a multi-stakeholder policy-making body with the mission
of promoting ‘environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and economically viable
management of the world’s forests, by establishing a worldwide standard of recognized
and respected Principles of Forest Management’.21 Its founders drew on several import-
ant currents of thought. The most obvious was the sustainable development-sustainable
forest management (SFM) discussion, which was incorporated directly into the organi-
zation’s guiding principles as described below. A related current was the concept
of multi-stakeholder decision-making, as had recently been incorporated in the US
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 199022 among many other state administrative policies.
The third was the more obscure lore of trans-governmental standard setting.23 At the
FSC’s founding, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) had been in
17 Gulbrandsen, supra note 2, at 80–81.
18 , available at http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/programs/forestry/smartwood/images/
smartwood-seal.gif.
19 For more detailed histories, see Elliott, supra note 14; Meidinger, ‘Human Rights, “Private” Environmen-
tal Regulation, and Community’, 6  Buffalo Environmental LJ (1999) 123, and B. Cashore, G. Auld, and
D. Newsom, Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority
(2004).
20 , available at http://www.fsc.org/gr/en/home_header/logo.gif.
21 Forest Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria for Forest Management, available at http://
www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/71/files/FSC_STD_01_001_FSC_Principles_and_Criteria_
for_Forest_Stewardship_2004_04.PDF.
22 101 PL 648; 104 Stat 4969 (1990).
23 See, generally, Hamilton, ‘The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health’, 56 Texas L Rev (1978) 1329; R.E. Cheit, Setting Safety
Standards: Regulation in the Public and Private Sectors (1990); H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Gov-
ernance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (2005).
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operation for over four decades, and had developed a large body of knowledge on
‘technical standard setting’ – defining, for instance, the required attributes of a 6 mm
screw or of the magnetic strip on a credit card.24 But the ISO had also recently ven-
tured into setting standards for organizational management systems with its ISO
9000 series of standards.25 Following the Rio Conference it had also begun work on
an Environmental Management Standard that would eventually become the ISO
14000 series.26 Although the standard ultimately focused almost entirely on organi-
zational procedures for analysis and management, it was nonetheless an important
development by virtue of focusing on corporate management capacity and account-
ability for performance. Additionally, some of the FSC’s founders had been involved
with self-consciously progressive trans-governmental standard-setting efforts, most
importantly in organic agriculture, where the International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) provided a fund of experience.27 Finally, the rise
and consolidation of an international trade regime structured by World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) rules and related national rules provided a surrounding frame within
which the FSC’s institutions were designed. While it was intended to counter the ill
effects of the rapidly expanding global timber market, the FSC also only makes sense
in the context of a well-functioning international trading system. It depends on the
use of market signals to institute incentives for environmental and social protection.
It is thus part of a whole family of ‘regulatory reform’ initiatives relying on markets,
information and flexibility that have emerged over the past three decades.28 Although
there remains some tension between the assumptions of the certification movement
and those of the international trading system, certification programmes have been
careful to avoid conflicts with international trade rules and have often made adjust-
ments to accommodate them. The legal status of forest certification programmes
under WTO rules remains subject to some doubt, however, and is still to be worked
out in the future.29
In sum, the FSC programme was built out of an amalgam of sustainable develop-
ment discourse, participatory, multi-stakeholder policy-making processes, technical
standard-setting conventions, and emerging international trade rules. These were
24 See generally Meidinger, supra note 19.
25 See generally, Roht-Arriaza, ‘Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organization for
Standardization, and International Environmental Lawmaking’, in G. Handl (ed.), 6 Yearbook of Int’l
Envt’l L (1995), at 107, 119. Essentially, the ISO 9000 standards sought to create standards for good
business management, or, as it was often called at the time, ‘total quality management’.
26 See generally, T. Tibor and I. Feldman, ISO 14000: A Guide to the New Environmental Management Stand-
ards (1995).
27 International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, available at http://www.ifoam.org; Cour-
ville, ‘Standards and Certification’, in P. Kristiansen and A. Taji (eds), Organic Agriculture: A Global Per-
spective (forthcoming); Personal Interviews.
28 Meidinger, ‘Forest Certification as Environmental Law Making by Global Civil Society’, in Meidinger,
Elliott, and Oesten, supra note 4, at 293, 304–308.
29 See Bernstein and Cashore, ‘Non-state Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alterna-
tive to a Global Forest Convention?’, in J.J. Kirton and M.J. Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Volun-
tary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (2004).
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also perforce central concerns of the competitor certification programmes that soon
arose in response to the FSC.
B Primary Actors
1 Forest Certification Programmes
The FSC is the driving force in forest certification, having challenged the forestry estab-
lishment with an ambitious structure and agenda since its inception. The FSC’s inter-
national governing body, the General Assembly, is constituted of three chambers –
economic, social and environmental – with equal voting power.30 These chambers are
further divided into Northern (developed country) and Southern (developing country)
sub-chambers, each also holding equal decisional power, thereby counterbalancing
the comparative over-representation of members from Northern countries and
addressing critiques that post-Rio sustainable development initiatives have been domi-
nated by Northern interests. While the General Assembly holds ultimate authority in
the FSC system, the organizational bylaws and statutes in fact delegate a great deal of
decisional authority to the nine-member Board of Directors, which traditionally acts in
close consultation with the Executive Director. Membership in the FSC is open to all
organizations and individuals who subscribe to the FSC’s principles and whose appli-
cations are endorsed by two existing members. Governments were originally barred
from membership, but in 2002 the General Assembly revised that policy to allow rep-
resentatives of government owned or controlled forest management organizations to
be members of the economic chamber.31 Certification bodies are also permitted to be
members of the Economic Chamber and a number of them participate quite avidly.
The 2005 General Assembly considered a proposal by a respected international staff
member to bar employees of the FSC from being members, but rejected it.32 Thus, FSC
30 Forest Stewardship Council AC Bylaws, available at http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/
84/files/FSC_By_laws__revised_November_2002.PDF. Members for the most part choose the chambers
of which they are members, although profit-making organizations are expected to join the economic
chamber. The idea that participation by environmental, economic, and social interests is key to good for-
est policy had been adopted in non-binding form for governments in the Rio Forest Principles: United
Nations, ‘Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Man-
agement, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests’, A/Conf.151/26, Principle
2d, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-3annex3.htm. It is interesting
to note that in the early years after the FSC was founded the economic chamber was denied structural
parity with the environmental and social chambers. Only after several years was it given equal voting
power. Even today the economic chamber is limited to two of the nine members of the Board of Directors.
31 Statutory Motion 2 to Allow Participation of Public Owned Companies. Final Motions and Results from
the FSC General Assembly 2002, available at http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/75/
files/FSC_General_Assembly_2002_Final_Motions.pdf. The bylaws also provide for independence from
governments as well as commercial organizations, although they permit acceptance of funding from and
collaboration with governments: supra note 29, para. 8.
32 FSC 2005 General Assembly Statutory Motion 2. The sponsor’s primary rationale was that a staff mem-
ber who was also a member of a specific chamber could not avoid the appearance of partiality when
responsible for carrying out the policies settled upon in the General Assembly. This view carried some
weight with many participants, but ultimately gave way to a pragmatic sense that these problems
could be handled in practice without barring staff members from membership and losing the value of their
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membership remains quite open and may be growing more so. At present the FSC has
approximately 600 members, two-thirds being organizations and one-third individuals.33
The FSC champions a broad and demanding set of standards for certification. For-
mally denominated ‘principles and criteria’ and described in more detail below, they
require conformance to applicable laws and treaties, possession of clear property
rights and a management plan, as well as protection of indigenous rights, workers,
local communities, biological diversity, and areas of high conservation value, among
other things.34 All of these are in turn put into practice through more detailed indica-
tors in national and regional standards, developed by local working groups with the
goal of tailoring the global principles and criteria to specific environments.35
The founding of the FSC met with considerable scepticism and hostility from most
traditional forestry interests. In North America, large forestry companies soon took
steps to establish their own certification programmes. This was not as difficult as one
might expect, because many large forest products corporations were familiar with the
ISO programmes and were casting about for ways to improve their generally poor
public images.36 Thus, the highly export-dependent Canadian forest industry collaborated
with the Canadian ISO affiliate, the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), to develop a
forestry-specific, ISO-based standard.37 In the United States, the American Forest and
Paper Association, comprising approximately 200 of the largest companies in the
industry, began to develop its own free-standing standard. The resulting Sustainable
Forestry Initiative (SFI) started out as a vague corporate code of conduct created by
staffers using focus groups to determine the minimum commitments necessary to
allay public distrust.38 Initially it did not even provide for the possibility of third-party
certification, but in 1998 it began to encourage, although not require, the practice.39
experience for open deliberations. One reading of this decision is that the FSC’s concept of how to have
an adaptive governance structure includes allowing the broadest possible legislative participation.
33 See http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/82/files/5_2_2_FSC_Membership_List__2005_
03_16.pdf. Individuals are limited to 10% of the total voting power in each sub-chamber, thus giving
effective control to organizational members: Bylaws, supra note 24, para. 13.
34 FSC Principles and Criteria of Forest Stewardship, available at http://www.fsc.org/en/about/policy_
standards/princ_criteria. The tendency to enunciate and attempt to propagate core principles seems to
typify not only the sustainable development and international human rights domains, but also more
technical areas of international regulation, such as banking and securities: see, e.g., Zaring, ‘Informal
Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration’, 5 Chicago J Int’l L (2005) 547, at 580.
35 National and regional standards are developed by National Initiatives, which are supposed to be struc-
tured so as broadly to reflect important interests in the relevant locale. In some particularly large coun-
tries, such as the US and Canada, specific standards are developed for individual regions. For a current
list of National Initiatives, see http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/77/files/5_1_2_2005_
10_20_FSC_National_Initiatives.pdf.
36 Nash, ‘Industry Codes of Practice: Emergence and Evolution’, in T. Dietz and P.C. Stern (eds), New Tools
for Environmental Protection: Education, Information, and Voluntary Measures (2002), at 235, 237–238.
37 Canadian Standards Association Standard for Forest Management, available at http://www.sfms.com/
csa.htm.
38 See Meidinger, supra note 19, for an early history.
39 See generally Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, ‘The United States’ Race to Certify Sustainable Forestry:
Non-State Environmental Governance and the Competition for Policy-Making Authority’, 5 Business and
Politics (2003) 219.
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The SFI has since gone through numerous other iterations, gradually getting
stronger and more detailed, and eventually being placed under the control of a nomi-
nally independent multi-stakeholder board.40
Several tropical countries have also developed their own certification programmes.
Indonesia, for example, has the Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI – Indonesia Ecolabel
Institute) programme.41 It is the result of a complex negotiation among traditional
forestry powers (primarily the powerful government ministries responsible for allo-
cating timber concessions on state-owned forests and large timber-producing corpor-
ate concessionaires) and emerging Indonesian and established transnational NGOs.
In part to counter ongoing enforcement and credibility problems, LEI has forged a
tenuous but continuing alliance with the FSC. Currently, products certified under
either programme must meet the requirements of both.42
Finally, in the late 1990s traditional European forestry interests entered the tourna-
ment of certification programmes. A few European forestry companies, particularly in
Scandinavia, had engaged in the FSC system from the outset, but most remained out-
side it. Many European forestry interests initially supported the idea of certifying tropi-
cal timber, because they felt unfairly disadvantaged by its lower environmental and
labour standards. When it became clear that requiring certification only of tropical
timber would violate international trade rules,43 however, and when environmental
groups began agitating for certification of European timber, they reacted angrily. This
was due to both the traditional high regard in which the European industry held itself
and the small size of many European forest owners, making it difficult for them to find
the economies of scale to readily finance and achieve FSC certification.44
After initially resisting certification, European forest owners gradually came to
accept it as inevitable and then decided to establish their own programme. The result-
ant Pan-European Forest Certification Council (PEFC) was formed during 1998 and
1999. It drew upon the by then substantial lore of forest certification and sustainable
forest management to form a system with many similarities to, but also important dif-
ferences from, the FSC. The first difference was that the PEFC portrayed itself not as
promulgating a single overall standard to be adapted to variable local conditions, but
rather as providing a common framework for the mutual recognition of nationally
based certification programmes that had adopted their own legitimate rules of sus-
tainable forestry, as well as an appropriate set of certification institutions to imple-
ment them. Second, although formed as a multi-stakeholder structure nominally
independent of governments, the PEFC is controlled largely by traditional forestry
interests, primarily landowners and European forest products corporations. These
40 Meidinger, Elliott, and Oesten, ‘The Fundamentals of Forest Certification’, in Meidinger, Elliott, and
Oesten, supra note 4, at 12–14.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Austria adopted such a statute in 1992 and shortly thereafter repealed it in the face of criticism from
developing countries and pressure from Austrian industrialists who feared a trade war: D. Humphries,
Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation (1996), at 73.
44 Meidinger, Oesten, and Elliott, supra note 40, at 17–18.
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interests also have longstanding relationships with and influence on European gov-
ernment forestry ministries, and the PEFC has brought government agencies into
more direct interactions with forest certification. The PEFC grew quickly and now
includes approximately 18 endorsed national programmes with another dozen in
process.45 In late 2003 the PEFC rechristened itself the Programme for the Endorse-
ment of Forest Certification, thereby opening membership to non-European pro-
grammes and laying claim to global reach.46
Overall, although the actual number of forest certification programmes and their
relationships to each other remain subject to a surprising amount of uncertainty, it is
clear that they are organized in two basic alliances. The first is the FSC system, which
is most closely identified with transnational environmental NGOs but also has sub-
stantial numbers of business and social justice members. The second is the PEFC alli-
ance, which is most closely identified with landowners and industry, but has
increasingly sought to bring in other interests. As noted above, these alliances con-
stantly monitor and adjust to each other. They show a considerable amount of insti-
tutional mimicry, but also promote procedures and standards that differ in various
ways, many of which are described below. They compete not only for certification cli-
ents, but also for approval and legitimacy in various arenas, including the forestry
sector, government policy and public opinion.
2 Other Certification-oriented Organizations
Both the FSC and the PEFC alliances maintain relationships with various other
certification-oriented organizations, some of which operate certification pro-
grammes in other sectors and others of which play umbrella roles. The FSC is part of
the International Social and Environmental Accrediting and Labelling Alliance
(ISEAL), a recently founded association of eight organizations involved in progressive
standard setting, certification, and labelling programmes.47 ISEAL’s purposes include
improving the standard-setting processes of its members and strengthening the gov-
ernance and legitimacy of their programmes.48 ISEAL’s strategy has been to accom-
modate and apply ISO processes, rather than to challenge them. The FSC also
increasingly refers to and seeks to comply with ISO standard-setting and certification
protocols. An important sister organization to the ISO, the International Accredita-
tion Forum (IAF), is an international association of nationally-based accreditation
bodies among whose goals is to create a single international programme of conform-
ity assessment for its members. Although ISEAL and some of its organizations were
45 PEFC Members and Schemes, available at http://www.pefc.org/internet/html/members_schemes/
4_1120_59.htm.
46 Endorsed non-European programmes currently exist in Australia, Brazil, Canada (the CSA programme),
and Chile. Countries with programmes likely to receive future endorsement include Gabon, Malaysia,
Russia, and the US SFI programme: ibid.
47 Current members include the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations, the Forest Stewardship Council, the
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, the International Organic Accreditation
Service, the Marine Aquarium Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, the Rainforest Alliance, and
Social Accountability International. See http://www.isealalliance.org/membership/founding.htm.
48 ISEAL Alliance, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/about/index.htm.
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earlier denied membership in the IAF (reportedly on grounds that they are interna-
tional, rather than national organizations), the PEFC recently gained associate mem-
bership. This could turn out to be important because the European Union treats IAF
membership as a condition of competency to carry out accreditation in the EU.49 Even
more recently, however, the FSC attained membership in the World Standards Serv-
ices Network (WSSN), which includes international standard-setting organizations
such as the ISO itself, as well as the International Electrotechnical Commission and
the International Telecommunication Union.50 WSSN members appear to enjoy con-
siderable deference in WTO analyses of technical barriers to trade, although the exact
nature of any such deference remains unclear.
3 Related Interest Groups
The importance of various business and environmental groups has already been men-
tioned. Their roles in the overall system are complex and shifting. Some corporations,
for example, participate in both the FSC and the PEFC alliances. The same is true of
some environmental organizations. The Nature Conservancy, for example, currently
has representatives on the boards of both the FSC-US and SFI. It is also important to
note that charitable foundations have been key supporters of the FSC programme.51
More distant from the official operations of the certification programmes, but still
important, have been a number of social movement actors. Already mentioned was
the tropical timber boycott brought by Northern environmental groups. In addition,
many large forest products corporations have been subject to various demonstrations,
lawsuits, shareholder resolutions, media campaigns, national regulatory initiatives,
and the like, which they typically see as posing risks that should be controlled.52
Among the most important actors in this arena have been the ‘forest campaigners’
who pressure large forest products organizations to embrace certification. In one
mode they have carried out large public media campaigns. Perhaps the most import-
ant of these was the campaign of the Rainforest Action Network (RAN – not to be
confused with the Rainforest Alliance) to persuade Home Depot Corporation, the
world’s largest home-improvement retailer,53 to embrace FSC certification. RAN held
a series of well dramatized and publicized demonstrations at Home Depot stores in
North America, seeking to associate the company’s brand with environmental
destruction. After more than two years and approximately 600 such actions,54 Home
49 Humphreys, ‘The Certification Wars: Forest Certification Schemes as Sites for Trade-Environment Con-
flicts’, paper presented to the ‘Privatizing Environmental Governance’ Panel, 46th annual convention of
the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1–5 Mar. 2005.
50 World Standards Services Network, available at http://www.wssn.net/WSSN/aboutwssn.html.
51 Among the most important have been the Ford, Macarthur, and Rockefeller Brothers. See generally
Elliott, supra note 14.
52 For a general discussion of the brand manipulation involved, see Haufler, ‘New Forms of Governance:
Certification Regimes as Social Regulations of the Global Market’, in Meidinger, Elliott, and Oesten, supra
note 40, at 237–247.
53 Home Depot Announces Record Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2004 Results, available at http://
ir.homedepot.com/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=156400.
54 Personal interviews.
58 EJIL 17 (2006), 47–87 
Depot agreed to promote FSC certification and to buy all of the FSC-certified products
it can find.55 Folklore has it that when RAN turned its attention to the second largest
US wood-products retailer, Lowes, only two phone calls and one meeting were neces-
sary to achieve a similar result.56 RAN has since carried out similar actions against a
multitude of major corporations. It celebrated an important victory in 2003, when
Boise Cascade, a major timber and forest products producer, agreed to stop selling
wood from ‘endangered forests’,57 and currently has its sights on Weyerhaeuser, a
major transnational forest products company,58 as well as a number of companies in
the finance sector.59
Forest campaigners also carry out more covert operations. These typically involve
visiting sites of tropical forest destruction and tracking the illegally logged timber to
retailers in developed countries. Once the forest campaigners have documented the
trail from devastated forest to Northern retailer (typically with photos and video cam-
eras, and sometimes with invoices obtained through dumpster diving) they contact
or visit the retailer’s corporate offices and threaten to publicize its complicity in the
destructive practices. Reportedly, such visits have led a number of corporations to
cease destructive practices, and sometimes to embrace certified products.60
4 Global Networks
Although global networks are ordinarily viewed as conduits rather than sources of
action, they play a more affirmative role in forest certification. The actors described
above depend heavily on preexisting global networks – most importantly transna-
tional business networks and product chains.61 These networks can be understood as
actors because they have built-in expectations and momentum. The commitments of
trade networks to profits and economic protection of their members are dynamic
directions that can activate them in favour of certification. And once a major network
actor such as Home Depot is committed to certification, it can activate other network
members in the same direction.
55 Carlton, ‘Against the Grain: How a Tiny Council Cut Logging Abuse’, Wall Street Journal, 26 Sept. 2000,
at A12.
56 This has been mentioned as fact by several interviewees, although documentation has not turned up.
Similar campaigns have been carried out in other countries. For example, Greenpeace Germany ran a
successful campaign to persuade the wood processing company, Rettenmeier, including some of its sup-
pliers in the Archangelsk region of Russia, to obtain FSC certification.
57 Boise Cascade Timber and Fiber Procurement Policy, available at http://www.bc.com/environment/
policyProcure.jsp. See also Rainforest Action Network, ‘19 Years of Impact: Annual Report for 2003’,
available at http://www.ran.org/about_ran/ran_annual_2003.pdf. See generally, Sasser, ‘The Certifi-
cation Solution: NGO Promotion of Private, Voluntary Self-Regulation’, paper presented at the 74th
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 29–31 May 2002, at Toronto, Ontario.
58 See http://www.ran.org/ran_campaigns/old_growth/.
59 Goldman Sachs recently announced a major greenward shift in its investment policies: Goldman Sachs
Environmental Policy Framework, available at http://www.gs.com/our_firm/our_culture/
social_responsibility/environmental_policy_framework/docs/EnvironmentalPolicyFramework.pdf.
60 Personal interviews.
61 Sasser, ‘Gaining Leverage: NGO Influence on Certification Institutions in the Forest Products Sector’, in
L. Teeter, B. Cashore, and D. Zhang (eds), Forest Policy for Private Forestry (2002).
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5 Governments
Governments are often portrayed as non-actors in forest certification, and indeed
their inability to act in concert to establish binding international forestry policies
combined with their increasing convergence on trade polices created important
preconditions for the rise of forest certification.62 In fact, however, governments are
involved in certification in a variety of ways. First, the threat of increased governmen-
tal regulation in the absence of effective non-governmental regulation has sometimes
been a background factor in the acceptance of certification. Second, certification pro-
grammes have generally sought to garner a certain amount of government and
public support by promoting conformance to existing government laws. Thus, cer-
tification programmes implicitly claim states as their allies by mandating compli-
ance with state laws. Third, many of the certification programmes draw directly on
government resources, such as criteria and indicators produced by intergovern-
mental organizations and conferences, and the non-FSC ones in particular can
involve fairly direct interactions with governments. Thus, the PEFC, CSA, and LEI
involved much government influence, albeit with limited roles for government offi-
cials in formal certification processes. Even in the FSC system, it is now possible for
representatives of government owned or controlled companies to be members of the
international economic chamber, and some national working groups involve gov-
ernment participants.
Recently, governments have become more directly involved in certification. Most
strikingly, a number of government agencies have chosen to obtain certification of
state owned and managed forests.63 While these actions sometimes reflect a desire to
retain or obtain market access, agencies sometimes also seem to think that their
broader political credibility or legitimacy may be enhanced by certification. Second, a
growing number of governments, particularly in Europe, have adopted certified forest
products procurement programmes, thus helping to create markets for certified prod-
ucts and lending further legitimacy to certification requirements.64 Third, several gov-
ernments either make certification a requirement for producing commercial timber in
their jurisdictions or treat certification as de facto compliance with applicable laws.65
Certification standard-setting processes also appear to have had considerable influ-
ence on the legal requirements of some governments.66 Finally, many governments
62 See, e.g., Bartley, ‘Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Social and Environ-
mental Certification Systems’, Working Paper, Dept. of Sociology, Indiana University (2005).
63 E.g., Paschalis, ‘Forest Certification in Poland’, in B. Cashore, F. Gale, E. Meidinger, and D. Newsom (eds),
Confronting Sustainability: Forest Certification in Developing and Transitioning Countries (forthcoming);
Actins and Kore, ‘Forest Certification in Latvia’, in ibid. Many other national and provincial land man-
agement agencies have also chosen to have their lands certified, although no comprehensive summary
appears to exist.
64 See generally, FERN, ‘To Buy or Not to Buy: Timber Procurement Policies in the EU’, Jan. 2004, avail-
able at http://www.fern.org/pubs/reports/procure.pdf; Sprang et al., ‘Public Procurement and Forest
Certification: Assessing the Implications for Policy, Law and International Trade’, Report to the European
Commission (forthcoming).
65 See, e.g., the case studies of Bolivia, Guatemala, Latvia, and Poland in Cashore et al., supra note 63.
66 Ibid.
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have become actively involved in an alliance with certification organizations, envi-
ronmental NGOs, and some transnational corporations in efforts to combat ‘illegal
logging’.67
6 Summary
Forest certification in particular, and transnational forestry regulation in general, is
worked out through complex interactions among a multitude of governmental and
non-governmental actors in multiple fora. It can therefore be understood neither as a
form of industry ‘self-regulation’, nor as a form of governmental or intergovernmental
regulation. Rather, it is increasingly taking the form of a transnational, rule-oriented
system made up of competing, mutually adjusting organizations and institutions.68
Important negotiations take place with regard to several types of issues. The next sec-
tion describes the primary institutional arrangements adopted by certification pro-
grammes, some of which are coming to be taken for granted and others of which
remain very much contested.
C Institutional Building Blocks
Each of the forest certification programmes outlined above draws upon and necessar-
ily interacts with a received body of certification experience. Trans-governmental
standard-setting systems have evolved four common institutional components. Most
obviously, a certification system needs procedures for setting the standards to which
enterprises are certified, and then for certifying that specific firms meet those stan-
dards. These are analogous to rule-making and adjudication (or licensing)69 proce-
dures in administrative law. In addition, most systems have developed methods for
accrediting certifiers. These are often quite important, since a certification process
must be accepted as credible if a certification programme is to be effective, and that
credibility may depend heavily on the credibility of the person carrying out the
review. Finally and more recently, a number of certification programmes have
developed requirements for labelling specific products as deriving from certified oper-
ations. These are particularly important where there is a considerable distance
between the production process and consumption. The following sections first discuss
forest certification in terms of their rule-making, adjudication and enforcement
mechanisms, and then characterize them in terms of some of the broader criteria of
administrative law, including stakeholder participation, deliberation, transparency,
expertise and accountability.
67 Tacconi, Boscolo, and Brack, ‘National and International Policies to Control Illegal Forest Activities’,
Center for International Forestry Research (2003), available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/
pdf_files/events/Illegal-logging.pdf.
68 By ‘institutions’ I mean standardized sets of practices, norms, and relationships for performing and stabi-
lizing social function: see, e.g., 13, R. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (1995).
69 Licensing (or permitting) is classified as a form of adjudication in US administrative law.
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2 Rule-making
Administrative rule-making is ordinarily structured by both substantive and proce-
dural requirements, as well as by customary practices and modalities of various
kinds. The same is true of forest certification.
A Substance
Substantive requirements in government-based administrative systems are typically
portrayed as deriving largely from statutes. But the statutes of state legal systems can
provide only limited guidance for global certification systems, since they vary by coun-
try and are perhaps implied to be inadequate by the very existence of certification pro-
grammes. Yet there exists a transnational discourse on sustainable forest
management (SFM), which provides much of the substantive framework for certifica-
tion programmes. When the FSC was founded, the concept of sustainable forestry had
long been the guiding credo of forestry.70 As a focal concept, it had undergone a long-
term debate and development, much of which had been incorporated in the norms and
sometimes the laws of forestry. In essence that development had gradually expanded
the criteria which forest managers must take into account from (1) ensuring a steady
flow of timber71 to (2) protecting the range of forest ecological functions, components
and services to (3) protecting the many societal interests tied to the forest (although
not always in this order). Much of this expansion occurred in tandem with the emer-
gence of ‘sustainable development’ discourse in the broader fields of environmental
regulation and economic development.72 These criteria are often in some conflict with
each other, since preserving ecological functions may not be the best way to maximize
timber yields, and since preserving societal interests may also be at odds with timber
production or ecological preservation.73 Moreover, which ecological and social inter-
ests should be protected, and how, are contested questions in most societies.
The FSC took a fairly aggressive, socially and environmentally protective stance in
promulgating its guiding Principles and Criteria. As noted above, they include require-
ments for the protection of indigenous peoples, workers, communities and the envir-
onment. It seems clear that many of these concepts were adopted from and
coordinated with the human rights and sustainable development movements in
70 But note that the FSC does not make any claim that certified forestry is in fact sustainable, first because
some of its own members object that no one can know for sure until many years after the certification
occurs, and secondly because ISO policies caution against use of the label.
71 For an illuminating review of the scientific elaboration of the sustained yield criterion, see Lowood, ‘The
Calculating Forester: Quantification, Cameral Science, and the Emergence of Scientific Forestry Manage-
ment in Germany’, in R. Frängsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and R.E. Rider (eds), The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th
Century (1990).
72 E.g., D. Humphreys, Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation (1996), at 66–69. On the
development of the concept of sustainable development in international environmental law see P. Sands,
Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn., 2003), at 252–266.
73 Schanz, ‘Sustainable Forest Management’, in J. Burley, J. Evans, and J. Youngquist (eds), Encyclopedia of
Forest Sciences (2004), 1345–1350; Romm, Sustainable Forestry: An Adaptive Social Process’, in G.H.
Aplet et al. (eds), Defining Sustainable Forestry (1993), at 280–293.
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international affairs. The FSC was thus seeking to impose standards in forestry that
incorporate concerns well beyond the common purview of profit-maximizing corpo-
rations. While this is similar to many state-based regulatory programmes, which seek
to curb selected negative externalities of economic activity, the FSC programme is
unusually ambitious in that it seeks to combine economic, environmental and social
regulation. These concerns would typically be divided among several state agencies, if
indeed they were addressed at all in national forest policy.
The rigorous requirements of the FSC programme played an important role in pro-
voking the industry response that ultimately led to the PEFC alliance of programmes.
First out of the box was the American Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA), which
produced a remarkably weak standard, but made it a requirement of continued mem-
bership in the Association. The SFI principles simply required member firms to commit
to practising and promoting sustainable forestry, improving long-term forest health
and productivity, managing lands ‘of special significance’ in appropriate ways, and
continuously improving their practices of forest management.74 Those principles were
given somewhat more detail in a series of objectives and performance measures, but
were still extremely loose and subject to interpretation. The original SFI standard con-
tained no requirements regarding workers, indigenous peoples or local communities.75
The Canadian Standards Association also produced a standard in the same time
period, arguably somewhat more demanding than the AF&PA’s in that it required
more stakeholder participation, but also considerably more friendly to industry than
was the FSC standard.76 The PEFC and its member programmes also produced more
industry-friendly standards, but accepted the legitimacy of including labour and
human rights concerns by adopting a definition of SFM originally developed by the
intergovernmental Helsinki Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in
Europe in 1993:
the stewardship and use of forest lands in a way and at a rate, that maintains their biodiver-
sity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and their potential to fulfill now and in the
future, relevant ecological, economic, and social functions, at local, national, and global lev-
els, and that does not cause damage to other ecosystems.77
Of course, the above definition, while affirming environmental, economic and
social responsibilities of forest managers, leaves much room for debate about their
74 Meidinger, supra note 19, at 206–207. As noted below, ‘continuous improvement’ is a hallmark of ISO-
style certification programmes.
75 The SFI’s explanation at the time was that these were matters of other policies and of state and federal
law.
76 The CSA eventually offered a substantive standard based on criteria and indicators developed by the
Canadian Council of Forest Ministers in tandem with the Helsinki and Montreal processes. Firms could
adopt this substantive standard if they wanted to, but could also opt to develop their own: see http://
www.csa-international.org/product_areas/forest_products_marking/program_documents/Z809-02_revised_
1030.pdf.
77 PEFC, available at http://www.pefc.org/internet/resources/5_1177_286_file.1038.pdf; MCPFE, Resolution
H1, Preamble, para. D (1993), available at http://www.mcpfe.org/resolutions/helsinki/resolution_h1.pdf.
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substance. And indeed very intensive debate has occurred both within and among
certification programmes. The major issues have included the following:
• limits on clear felling
• duties to protect old growth forests
• duties to protect endangered species and habitats
• the relationship between natural forests and plantations
• limits on use of chemicals and genetically modified organisms
• limits on the introduction of non-native species
• duties to workers
• duties to local communities
• duties to indigenous peoples
It is neither possible nor important to detail the evolution of the debate and stan-
dards in this paper. Broadly speaking, while there are still considerable and import-
ant differences between the industry-oriented programmes and the FSC, there has
been a significant convergence, more in the direction of the FSC standards than vice
versa.78 Forest certification rule-making processes have thus been a central domain
for both contesting and defining the meaning of sustainable forest management. At
a relatively high level of abstraction the concept now seems to embody several key
principles, some explicit and others implicit. First, forestry enterprises have duties
to protect both environmental functions and dependent social groups, such as
indigenous peoples, local communities and workers. As will become more apparent
below, these are defined in terms of both substantive and procedural elements. One
important emerging tendency is that forestry firms seeking certification are begin-
ning to take responsibility for fostering local civic and democratic institutions in
developing and transitioning societies.79 Second, a defining, if often unstated and
unchallengeable, purpose of forestry and forest certification is to support effective
and functional global markets. Such markets require local institutions capable of
stabilizing forestry and protecting property rights. Forest certification programmes
therefore must mesh with and promote effective local and national social control
institutions.
78 Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, supra note 39; Meridian Institute, Comparative Analysis of the Forest
Stewardship Council and Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification Programs (2001); Humphries, ‘The Cer-
tification Wars: Forest Certification Schemes as Sites for Trade-Environment Conflicts’, paper presented
to the Privatizing Environmental Governance Panel, 46th annual convention of the International Stud-
ies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1–5 Mar. 2005; Overdevest, ‘Treadmill Politics, Information Politics,
and Public Policy: Toward a Political Economy of Information’, 18 Organization and Environment (2005)
72; McDermott, Noah, and Cashore, ‘Differences That “Matter”? Identifying Analytical Challenges in the
Comparison of Forest Certification Standards’, Working Paper, Yale Program on Forest Certification,
available at www.yale.edu/forestcertification/pdfs/McDNoahCash120205.pdf.
79 Tysiachniouk and Meidinger, ‘Using Forest Certification to Strengthen Rural Communities: Cases from
Northwest Russia’, Paper prepared for the ASA Mini-Conference on ‘Community and Ecology: The Inter-
section of Community Sociology and Environmental Sociology’, 12–13 Aug. 2004, San Francisco,
under journal review, available at www.law.buffalo.edu/eemeid/scholarship/FCNWRussia.pdf; Cashore
et al. (eds), supra note 63.
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The emergent substantive principles governing forest certification thus include
local environmental and social responsibility combined with protected property
rights, stable local institutions, and effective markets. These can be read in either a
‘weak’ or a ‘strong’ way. The weak reading would suggest that the shared substan-
tive norms are so vague and general as to provide little meaningful guidance, and so
toothless as to provide few effective checks on the relentless pressures for corporate
profits. The ‘strong’ reading would suggest that the principles reflect a significant
movement toward a shared global understanding of proper forest management, and
that this understanding is likely to affect practices by virtue of being embedded in a
large and proliferating set of governance institutions. Not surprisingly, much of the
debate on these matters has in fact taken the form of a debate about institutional
arrangements. Indeed, the governing substantive principles are almost always pack-
aged with a set of preferred institutions. The underlying assumptions are not merely
that the chosen institutions will implement the principles, but that they will play a
role in determining the future contents of the principles.
B Form
The FSC’s certification standards are relatively prescriptive and moderately specific.
The indigenous rights principle can be taken as an example:
Principle 3: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, ter-
ritories, and resources shall be recognized and respected.80
Each principle is further specified through ‘criteria’ such as the following:
. . .
3.3 Sites of special cultural, ecological, economic or religious significance to indigenous peo-
ples shall be clearly identified in cooperation with such peoples, and recognized and protected
by forest managers.
3.4 Indigenous peoples shall be compensated for the application of their traditional knowledge
regarding the use of forest species or management systems in forest operations. This com-
pensation shall be formally agreed upon with their free and informed consent before forest
operations commence.81 ...
The principles and criteria are further detailed in area-specific national and
regional standards, of which there are dozens.82 The US Northeast Regional standard,




82 National standards are prepared for countries in which forestry conditions are comparable across areas,
and regional standards for larger countries with significant variations among regions. See, e.g., the US
regional standards, available at http://www.fscus.org/documents/index.php. There is an ongoing dis-
cussion in the FSC about how to define geographic areas appropriate for individual standards.
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3.2.a. Forest owners or managers identify and contact American Indian groups that have
current legal or customary-use rights to the management area, and invite their participation
in jointly planning forestry operations that affect their resources.
3.2.b. Forest owners or managers incorporate safeguards in management planning to ensure
that management actions do not adversely affect tribal resources, either directly or indirectly.
For example:
• Forest operations protect spawning and rearing areas for migratory fish harvested by Native tribes
and bands.
• Forest operations maintain populations of culturally important species, such as moose, that are harvested
on nearby tribal lands.
• Forest operations protect other resources identified through consultations described in 3.2a.
(emphasis in original)
Although the full sets of FSC standards are much more extensive, the above exam-
ples provide enough material for the analyst of global administrative law to discern
several things. First, these provisions could easily be the product of a government
administrative agency – if one had ever been given such far-reaching jurisdiction.
Second, although they are prescriptive, the standards leave much room for discre-
tion. The certifier, like the government inspector, must work out their meaning on
the ground. This is all the more the case because there are tensions among and within
the standards. The Northeast Regional standard regarding customary community
use rights makes one of them quite explicit:
2.2.a. The forest owner or manager allows customary tenure and use rights of the forest to the
extent that they are consistent with the conservation of the forest resource and the objectives
as stated in the management plan . . . . Use rights that are not legally recognized or enforceable
are subject to implied or expressed consent of the landowner.
In general, the requirements of industry-based programmes tend to be both more lim-
ited and more discretionary. Thus the SFI standards generally include more flexible or
discretionary provisions than the cognate FSC standards. Nonetheless, the SFI standards
have gradually become somewhat more prescriptive through successive revisions. Some
indicators have been converted from advisory to compulsory. The SFI and FSC standards
still reflect a longstanding division about the appropriate institutional structure of certifi-
cation programmes. On the one side have been proponents of FSC-style ‘performance
standards’ and on the other those of ‘management system’ standards. Performance stan-
dards require the achievement of concrete conditions in the forest or in human organiza-
tions related to the forest. Management system standards focus on defining management
responsibilities and processes within forest management organizations.
The font of management system standards is the ISO, and most directly the ISO
14001 environmental management system (EMS) standard mentioned above. The
basic idea is to require the forest management organization to define and implement a
specific set of responsibilities and processes for dealing with environmental and related
issues. EMSs typically include arrangements for (1) ascertaining the organization’s
environmental effects; (2) planning how to increase the positive effects and/or
decrease the negative ones; (3) achieving ‘continuous improvement’; (4) monitoring,
reporting on and correcting performance; and (5) allocating responsibilities for
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carrying out all of these functions. The underlying argument for EMSs is that harness-
ing the planning and control capacities of the forest management organization to the
goal of improving environmental performance may achieve better results in a dynamic
and uncertain environment than would reliance on fixed performance standards.83
Although the mix varies, today’s forest certification programmes contain elements
of both types of standards. There is some obvious intelligence in using environmental
management systems, because they harness the regulated firm’s internal procedures
to the purposes of the regulatory programme. And this harnessing includes not only
carrying out predetermined objectives, but also thinking about what the objectives
should be and how best to achieve them. The difficulty is that it also allows for consid-
erable dispute about the appropriate locus of policy-making authority. In a pure EMS
system, the maximum possible amount of policy-making authority is retained in the
firm. In a pure performance standard system, policy discretion in firms is minimized.
Although the issue is still vigorously debated, it seems clear that over the past several
years both alliances have accepted the need for a mixed system, where deliberation
and policy-making occur at both the firm and programme levels.
C Federalism
The discussion of performance versus environmental management system rules is one
indicator of the difficulty of determining the appropriate level of centralization for mak-
ing various kinds of policy decisions. Management systems approaches of course
devolve maximum discretion to the lowest possible level, the individual management
unit, while performance approaches tend to focus on a higher level of rule-making. The
second indicator is the relationship between global, national and sub-national stan-
dards in the various certification programmes. The FSC is relatively centralized, starting
with global principles and criteria and then scaling down to national and sub-national
locales. The industry-based programmes are formally structured at the national level
and federated into international arrangements, although the PEFC is probably better
understood as having been an international European arrangement from the outset. In
practice the differences between the programmes seemed to be declining for a while, but
may now be expanding again. On the one hand, the FSC is becoming increasingly
attuned to dealing with local variation, as exemplified by its growing stress on national
initiatives and its increasingly decentralized structure.84 The PEFC, on the other
83 See, e.g., C. Coglianese and J. Nash (eds), Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Sys-
tems Achieve Policy Goals? (2001); Potoski and Prakash, ‘Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and
Facilities’ Environmental Performance’ 24 J Policy Analysis and Management (2005) 745; Parker, ‘Rein-
venting Regulation Within the Corporation: Compliance-Oriented Regulatory Innovation’, 32 Adminis-
tration and Society (2000) 529.
84 Starting in 2002 the FSC moved to create regional offices for the various continents. It has also spent
considerable effort on revising its standards for accrediting national initiatives. A policy document pre-
pared for the 2005 General Assembly in Manaus, Brazil, contains the following statement:
‘In addition to globally consistent objectives, systems, quality, integrity and credibility, FSC increasingly needs
regional and national flexibility in implementing its systems, standards and approaches. Different regions need
to develop specific approaches to building and servicing market demand (e.g., North America, Europe), to
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hand, has sometimes seemed interested in producing more globally consistent
standards and processes, but in the course of its globalization has also loosened
some of its standard-setting requirements to allow greater variation. Its Executive
Director continues to emphasize the importance of the subsidiarity principle in the
system.85
Both alliances face considerable challenges of ‘harmonization’, first of stan-
dards across regions, such as the US Northeast and the US Great Lakes, next of
standards for relatively similar environments across international borders, such
as the US Northeast and the Canadian Maritime Provinces, and ultimately of
standards for places that vary enormously. Thus, for the FSC some of the most
difficult long-term challenges will involve persuading Northern consumers that
timber produced by unorganized workers working for marginal corporations in
developing countries, who may be using unshielded tools and wearing no protec-
tive clothing, is really the equivalent of timber produced by unionized European
workers working for well capitalized corporations and using large, sophisticated
machines designed for safety and wearing protective gear. Ultimately, the standard-
setting processes in each programme must deal with such problems and create
plausible normative understandings of what comparability means. This challenge
remains largely for the future, however. For now, both the FSC and the PEFC
seem to be concentrating more heavily on developing standards adapted to local
conditions.
D Procedure
The certification universe has seen considerable elaboration and convergence of rule-
making procedures in recent years. All certification programmes claim to be partici-
patory and transparent. The FSC started out with relatively elaborate structures and
procedures for rule-making. Not only does it have the tripartite ostensibly representa-
tive legislature of the General Assembly, but it also generally subjects new rules and
policies to public notice and comment procedures analogous to those of administra-
tive agencies in most modern governments.
The programmes in the PEFC alliance have slowly followed suit. While the SFI
standards originated as products of staff members working with member companies
and consumer focus groups, they now go through a web-based notice-and-comment
procedure with ultimate promulgation by a multi-stakeholder governing board made
promoting and servicing market supply (e.g., Canada, Russia, tropical hardwood forests and planta-
tions), and to linking demand and supply (e.g., China and east Asia)’ (emphasis in original).
Forest Stewardship Council, FSC Strategy, ‘Institutional, Organizational and Operational Development
of the Global Network of the Forest Stewardship Council’, Draft for Discussion by the FSC General Assem-
bly 2005, Nov. 2005.
85 Forest Certification Watch, Interview with Heiko Liedeker, FSC’s Executive Director, and Ben
Gunneberg, PEFC’s General Secretary, 2 July 2004, available at http://www.certificationwatch.org/
print.php3?id_article=1845. Subsidiarity refers to the idea that any given policy decision ought to be
made at the least centralized level at which it can effectively be made.
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up of five AF&PA members and 10 outsiders chosen from academia, state and local
agencies, professional associations and environmental groups.86
Most rule-making in the PEFC alliance is done at the national level. National pro-
grammes were originally expected to fall within the general criteria of sustainability
developed by the Pan-European Ministerial Conferences, but can now be based on a
broader set of processes. The standard procedure for each country is roughly as fol-
lows: (1) an existing forest owners’ organization invites other national organizations
representing ‘relevant and interested parties’ to constitute a ‘national governing body
for the programme’; (2) the national governing body constitutes a forum, again invit-
ing all relevant parties (e.g., forest owners, trade unions, NGOs), and then develops a
certification programme appropriate to that country; (3) the resulting programme is
submitted to the PEFC, which appoints external consultants to prepare a report
assessing the proposed programme under PEFC criteria; (4) the consultant reviews
the programme and invites comments from ‘all interested parties’;87 and then makes
a recommendation to the PEFC, which (5) ultimately decides whether to endorse the
programme.
In sum, all of the major programmes now employ notice and comment procedures,
and provide for at least some stakeholder involvement. The PEFC processes are still
ultimately controlled by landholder and industry groups, who choose which addi-
tional stakeholders are included in the decisional process. The FSC at least requires a
tripartite structure with equally distributed voting power, but it should be noted that
the FSC still exerts some control on who can join in that an applicant must be sup-
ported by at least two existing members.
The effort to define appropriate rule-making processes for trans-governmental
standard setting is still very much in process. The ISEAL Alliance recently developed a
‘code of good practice’ for social and environmental standard setting which it pre-
sumably believes will contribute to the legitimacy of certification programme stan-
dards.88 Many of the guidelines are framed in language that could as well be used by
government agencies – and indeed, the guidelines are written to be equally applicable
to governmental and non-governmental processes. Standard-setting processes
should (1) follow documented procedures; (2) consider comments on the need for and
objectives of the standard; (3) allow two rounds of public comment on proposed stan-
dards; (4) keep a record of the standard-setting process; and (5) produce a written,
publicly available synopsis of how each material issue raised in the comments was
addressed in the standard.89 Except for the multiple comment period requirements,
the guidelines could have been taken directly from the US Administrative Procedure
Act, and no doubt those of other countries as well.
86 Sustainable Forestry Board, available at http://www.afandpa.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Environment_and_Recycling/SFI/Sustainable_Forestry_Board/Sustainable_Forestry_Board.htm.
87 Solicitations for comments on proposed Brazilian, Slovak, and Estonian endorsements are posted on the
PEFC website at this writing: see http://www.pefc.org/internet/html/.
88 ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards. P004 – Version 3 – Jan.
2004, available at http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/General/ISEALCodeFinal.pdf.
89 Ibid., section 5.
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Many government agencies, however, operate under delegated authority from rep-
resentative democracies. Trans-governmental rule-making processes generally do
not. Seeking to draw upon and extend directions drawn from ISO and WTO guide-
lines,90 the ISEAL code addresses this problem by mandating that standard setting
‘strive for consensus among a balance of interested parties’. The definition of consen-
sus is drawn from the ISO:
3.1 Consensus: General agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to
substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process seeking to
take into account the views of interested parties, particularly those directly affected, and to
reconcile any conflicting arguments.
Note - Consensus need not imply unanimity.91
‘Interested party’ is defined liberally by ISEAL as ‘any person or group concerned
with or directly affected by a standard’.92 Furthermore, the ISEAL standard provides
that the ‘[s]tandard setting organization shall ensure that participation reflects a bal-
ance of interests among interested parties in the subject matter and in the geographic
scope to which the standard applies’93 and that ‘no group of interested parties can
dominate nor be dominated in the decision-making process’. Thus, in this vision a
rule is legitimated by the participation (or at least opportunity to participate) in a con-
sensus decision process of all who are affected or concerned. This is not yet the prac-
tice of all forest certification programmes. The FSC is easily the farthest along, but has
also had some problems with implementation. In the regional standard-setting proc-
esses for the Canadian Maritimes and British Columbia, for example, one of two eco-
nomic seats in the working group was allocated to a representative of large industry;
the other went to a small operator. In both cases the large industry representatives
were sufficiently dissatisfied to stop participating in the process and were not part of
the ‘consensus’ that eventually was obtained. Although the resulting standards were
both initially accepted by FSC international, they caused considerable consternation
and ultimately appear to have led to a change in the FSC’s applied understanding of
consensus so that industry acceptance of the standards is expected. The PEFC is moving
on these issues, but much more slowly. It provides for notice and comment but does
not require broad-based participation or acceptance in national standard setting.
Nonetheless, the general tendency to extend procedural and structural participation
90 ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996, ‘Standardization and related activities – General vocabulary’; ISO/IEC Guide
59:1994, ‘Code of good practice for standardization’; ISO/IEC Guide 14024:1999, ‘Environmental labels
and declarations – Type 1 environmental labelling – Principles and procedures’; WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT), Annex 3: Code of good practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards;
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Second Triennial Review, Annex 4: Principles for
the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Arts 2, 5,
and Annex 3 of the Agreement.
91 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1996, supra note 90.
92 ISEAL Code, supra note 88, Sect. 3.2. This is a relatively broad definition. Some standard-setting organi-
zations limit the term to those who are directly affected by standards. ISO 14004 opted for the broader
definition, however.
93 Ibid., Sect. 7.1.
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may reflect the underlying conceptual pull of the concept of participation with which
the programmes are contending.94
The underlying idea is that a standard will be good, and presumably legitimate, if it
reflects the priorities of interested parties. While this concept of the public interest is
not free of theoretical problems, it is difficult to argue that interested parties should
not be heard, and it is also difficult to argue that a standard which receives the assent
of all affected and concerned parties is bad. Finally, of course this vision has had a sig-
nificant influence on concepts of governmental decision-making as well, perhaps
because delegations of authority from elected bodies implemented by expert agencies
are not always enough to produce well-accepted standards.
3 Adjudication and Enforcement
The significance of forest management standards is largely a function of the degree to
which they are put into practice on the ground. Given the incentives of firms to mini-
mize costs, certification programmes must have methods for judging and enforcing
compliance. These are conventionally broken down into three functions: certifica-
tion, accreditation and labelling.
A Certification
Assessing the eligibility of forest management operations for certification is the prim-
ary adjudicatory process of the global forest regulatory system. Certifying good forest
management is the main reason that certification programmes exist. Certification
programmes must persuade observers that they reliably distinguish good forest man-
agement from bad. There has been much debate among and within programmes
about the institutional arrangements necessary to make this process work. Some of
the issues concern procedures, others qualifications of certifiers. The typical certifica-
tion procedure as instituted by the FSC involves the following steps:
(1) preliminary discussions between the potential applicant and one or more certifi-
ers, including indications of what changes the applicant likely would have to
make to achieve certification;
(2) submission of an application to a certifier, including documentation of the appli-
cant’s operation;
(3) negotiation of a budget and other contractual terms of the assessment, possibly
including a ‘scoping’ process;
(4) an on-the-ground field assessment, including:
(a) review by an interdisciplinary team that would typically be made up of sev-
eral individuals, including forestry, biology and social science experts;
94 Margaret Shannon argues that unconstrained participation is inherent in the concept of sustainable
governance: Shannon, ‘What is Meant by Public Participation in Forest Certification Processes? Under-
standing Forest Certification Within Democratic Governance Institutions’, in Meidinger, Elliott, and
Oesten, Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification, supra note 40, at 179.
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(b) consultations with local stakeholders;95
(5) preparation of a draft assessment report by the certifier;
(6) peer review of the report by two or three independent specialists;96
(7) discussion of possible terms and conditions of certification with the applicant;
(8) a final certification decision (see below);
(9) issuance of a certificate, processing of final payments, further certification con-
tracts, press releases, etc; and
(10) annual follow-up audits
Certifiers have several options in reaching a final decision on certification: (1) approve
the application unconditionally; (2) grant provisional approval on condition that
specified ‘corrective actions’ are taken to rectify specified ‘minor non-compliances’
within a certain time; (3) indicate that approval will be granted after certain ‘major
non-compliances’ are corrected; or (4) deny the application. The bulk of FSC certifica-
tion proceedings seem to result in the second option: provisional approval with cor-
rective action requirements.97 FSC certificates ordinarily last for five years, after
which time a thoroughgoing reassessment takes place prior to renewal.
Several things about the FSC process deserve note. On the positive side, it requires
an on-the-ground inspection as well as consultation with local stakeholders. It thus
combines the often separate permitting, hearing and inspection processes that might
typify, for example, the granting of a discharge permit under the US Clean Water Act.
It also involves probably more public participation than the typical notice and com-
ment process in a discharge permit, since the certifier is expected to seek out public
comment, rather than simply receive it. Although the FSC procedure was initially the
only one to require local stakeholder consultations, the PEFC has very recently
changed its policy to require local consultations as well; what this will mean in prac-
tice remains to be seen.98
On the other hand, although required by the FSC to be a ‘third party’99 – that is,
neither an employee of the firm, nor one of its customers or suppliers – the certifier is
selected and paid by the organization seeking certification. This poses a problem
which can be seen either as a vague tendency to favour the applicant where
standards are indeterminate or as a structural risk of corruption, depending on one’s
95 Most stakeholder consultation processes to date have been developed by certification organizations. The
FSC is working to systematize information on and approaches to local consultation.
96 In order to reduce costs, the peer review requirement does not apply in FSC’s programme for Small and
Low Intensity Managed Forests, essentially small operations and operations that do not carry out inten-
sive logging. See http://www.fsc.org/slimf/.
97 Thornber, ‘Overview of Global Trends in FSC Certificates: Instruments for Sustainable Private Sector For-
estry’, Report of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) (1999).
98 PEFC press release, 12 April 2005, available at http://www.pefc.org/internet/html/news/4_1154_65/
5_1105_1174.htm.
99 Although the FSC has required third party verification from the beginning, the other programmes made
it optional to various degrees. There has been a long evolution among them encouraging and gradually
urging or requiring third party verification, but this has been largely tied to labelling requirements, dis-
cussed below.
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perspective. The FSC attempts to deal with this problem by reviewing selected accred-
itation decisions of certifiers, with the option of suspending or revoking their status as
certifiers if problems occur, and also by steadily increasing the level of transparency of
certification proceedings, as discussed below.
The FSC has a procedure for handling complaints about certification decisions,
but it is relatively cumbersome and constrained. Only FSC members are allowed to
lodge complaints; thus non-members must bring complaints to the FSC through
members.100 Before lodging a complaint a member must make reasonable attempts
to resolve the dispute informally. When a complaint is filed it first goes through an
‘informal’ stage, which is basically a mediation handled by either a Board member or
the chair of the Dispute Resolution Committee. If that does not resolve the issue the
dispute can move to a second ‘formal’ stage, which requires that two members file a
formal complaint and that they post funds to cover possible costs of the process. This
stage is basically a ‘paper hearing’, with either the Board or the Dispute Resolution
Committee reviewing written filings. The decision-making body also has discretion
to invite oral presentations or make site visits. Decisions by the Board may be
appealed to the Committee, but there is no appeal from decisions of the Commit-
tee.101 Apart from the requirement that complainants be prepared to pay the costs,
the FSC process is not very different from the informal adjudication procedures com-
mon in state-based legal systems, which are also often limited to a narrow set of par-
ties, and indeed frequently may be initiated only by government officials or regulated
parties.
While the official dispute resolution procedure is relevant, it is also the case that
the FSC International Secretariat, Board, and National Initiatives are likely to
respond to serious allegations of problems beyond the formalities of the procedure.
This indeed has happened in many cases. There are real questions, however,
whether either process is adequate to handle the pervasive benefit-of-the-doubt
dynamics that are likely to characterize many certification processes. The SFI and
PEFC also face this problem, and probably more severely in that certifiers have con-
siderably more discretion in their programmes, but they try to distance themselves
from the problem in different ways. For the PEFC, it is up to the national certification
programme to decide how to handle complaints and disputes, although none of the
various national programme approaches studied to date seem very rigorous or trans-
parent. The SFI has gradually expanded its programme from one in which loggers
can confidentially report ‘inconsistent practices’ to the Sustainable Forestry Board to
one in which ‘any party’ can challenge a certification before a Special Appeals
100 FSC Interim Dispute Resolution Protocol, Approved by the Board, 27 Jan. 1998, FSC Document 1.4.3,
available at http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/47/files/Interim_Dispute_Resolution_
Protocol.PDF. The FSC is currently working to revise its dispute resolution protocol, and ongoing discus-
sions suggest that it is likely to loosen some of the constraints in the current system and as well as reduce
the number of steps.
101 The Committee is most likely to be the first decision-maker in complaints involving decisions of the
Board. Otherwise the Board is likely to be the first decision-maker, although it may choose to send a dis-
pute directly to the Committee: ibid., para. 21.
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Subcommittee of the Board.102 While all of the procedures are constrained in one way
or another, they seem to be expanding.
The tendency of certification programmes to repose so much trust in certifiers is dif-
ficult to explain. Some of it probably has to do with a general technocratic confidence
in expertise, together with the particular history of the forestry profession in gather-
ing a high level of public trust to itself over generations. Such reliance seems likely to
prove more fragile in forest certification than in some other types of private certifica-
tion programmes. This is because buyers of certified products are less likely to dis-
cover poor certification work than would be the case where the certified product in
fact performs poorly in the use to which it is put.
Additionally, most of the information in the work products of the certification pro-
cess belongs to the applicant after the certification decision is made. However, the
tendency is to disclose an increasing amount of such information. The FSC requires
that the certifier prepare a public certification summary containing ‘sufficient
information to make clear the correlation between the specific results of the certifica-
tion assessment and FSC principles’.103 This must be available on a website and must
be in the main local native language and in one of the official languages of the FSC
(English and Spanish).104 It must also include a description of the certification pro-
cess, the qualifications of the certification team, and any corrective action requests.105
These public information requirements have been gradually expanded over time, and
until recently greatly exceeded those imposed by other programmes, where the main
public administrative record would simply be a yes/no answer. The PEFC recently
announced that it has changed its policy to require that a summary of each certifica-
tion audit be made available to the public.106 Both this change and the PEFC’s
decision to require local stakeholder consultations were driven by the UK govern-
ment’s purchasing policy criteria, which require such policies in order for certified
products to be eligible for government purchasing. Limited as the public information
requirements of the more conservative forest certification programmes are, it should
be noted that they may be equal to or greater than most government reporting of
inspection results.
102 SFI Audit Procedures and Qualifications, Section 9.3.2, Disputes or Appeals Questioning the Validity of a
Certification (http://www.aboutsfb.org/generalPDFs/SFBStandard2005-2009.pdf). The complainant
must first bring the problem to the attention of the certified programme participant, but if not satisfied
after 45 days can take it to the President of the Sustainable Forestry Board, who sends it to the Certifica-
tion Appeals Subcommittee, which decides whether to pursue the matter or close it.
103 Amended Motion 26A, 1999 General Assembly, available at http://www.fsc.org/keepout/en/
content_areas/77/76/files/FSC_General_Assembly_1999_Final_Motions.pdf. This has since been
elaborated into a detailed set of requirements in the Accreditation Standard: Forest Certification Public




106 Press Release, 12 April 2005, supra note 98.
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1 Accreditation
Given their heavy reliance on certifier expertise and credibility, much debate among
forest certification programmes has focused on what qualifications certifiers should
have and how they should be accredited. The FSC conducts its own relatively inten-
sive accreditation processes, and currently lists 15 accredited certification organiza-
tions.107 As noted above, it also reviews the work of certifiers and on several occasions
has suspended the accreditation status of certifiers.108 The FSC recently reviewed its
overall accreditation programme to bring it in line with ISO protocols.109 It has also
spun off the accreditation unit into an independently registered company and
required it to be financially self-sustaining.110 Most other forest certification pro-
grammes rely directly on general ISO-affiliated accreditation programmes, which are
usually nationally based and carry out multiple types of certifications in a variety of
non-forestry programmes. The SFI, for example, requires that the leader of any third-
party verification team be accredited as an ‘environmental management systems lead
auditor’ under the appropriate ISO-affiliated national accreditation body,111 that a
professional forester serve on each team, and that the team include expertise in wild-
life ecology, silviculture, forest hydrology and operations (not necessarily in separate
individuals).112
2 Labelling
Because forest certification programmes are centred on the idea of certifying the pro-
priety of wood products to downstream market participants, their policies for label-
ling those products have become increasingly important. There are two basic
dimensions to these policies. The first involves the need to distinguish certified from
uncertified wood through what are often very complex production chains. The ‘chain
of custody’ policies113 vary among the certifying organizations, but even the relatively
stringent FSC allows use of the FSC logo on products that do not consist entirely of
FSC-certified fibre. The second has to do with the claims that are made on the prod-
ucts. These are dealt with through increasingly detailed and stringent controls on the
use of programme-based labels. The controls are structured and enforced largely
107 FSC Accredited Certification Bodies, available at http://www.fsc.org/en/about/accreditation/
accred_certbod.
108 E.g., FSC Press Release, ‘FSC Reinstates Skal Chain of Custody Accreditation’, 16 May 2001, available at
http://www.forestrycenter.org/headlines.cfm?RefID=74391.
109 FSC Accreditation Process for Applicant Certification Bodies, 18 Jan. 2004, available at http://
www.fsc.org/keepout/en/content_areas/77/35/files/ABU_GUI_10_111_final.pdf.
110 Report by Alistair Monument, head of the Accreditation Business Unit, to the FSC General Assembly in
Manaus, Brazil, 7 Dec. 2005.
111 Examples include the American National Standards Institute/Registrar Accreditation Board and the
Canadian Environmental Auditing Association. This requirement only becomes effective one year after
the relevant national accreditation body accepts SFI audit experience as appropriate for meeting its
experience requirements.
112 The SFB does have a ‘verifiers accreditation subcommittee’, however, and it is possible that more
requirements will be introduced. See http://www.aboutsfb.org/committees.cfm.
113 FSC Chain of Custody Policy, available at http://www.fsc.org/coc/. PEFC Chain of Custody Policy, avail-
able at http://www.pefc.org/internet/resources/5_1177_452_file.1299.pdf.
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through national and international trademark law. Each forest certification pro-
gramme has developed a logo or set of logos to signify the status of the product
within its programme,114 as well as detailed policies with regard to use of logos.
Recently, logos have become increasingly complex, with both the FSC and the PEFC
having different versions depending on the claim being made.115 Like many other
elements of the programmes, these logo policies seem to be converging to some
extent, perhaps in part because they operate in the same world of trademark law
and in part because they respond to the same complexities in international timber
markets.
B Enforcement
Because certification programmes are self-defined as voluntary, it is not surprising
that formally they have few enforcement mechanisms. The official enforcement
mechanisms of most forest certification programmes are limited to revoking the
certification itself or to revoking membership in the related association.116 In fact,
however, the enforcement system is more extensive than this. First, certified for-
estry companies are engaged in increasingly well-controlled product chains. If
their customers are committed to buying certified products, loss of a certificate is
likely to be accompanied by loss of business. This has occurred in several cases and
serves as an important sanction for failing to demonstrate compliance with certifi-
cation standards. Second, as described above, many major retailers have commit-
ted to carrying certified products at least in part because they are under steady
pressure to do so. The Forest Campaigners regularly scan the forest products trad-
ing system for vulnerable targets – and potential targets know this, much as they
may resent it. Thus external scrutiny by activist groups, and the possible bad or
good publicity they can provide often serve as powerful sanctions, particularly for
branded companies.117 Finally, the multiple institutionalization of forest certifica-
tion seems to be developing its own momentum. The further the forestry industry
goes down the road of certification, and the more institutionalized its direction
becomes in the various ways described above, the less likely it is to reverse course.
This process by which procedures and expectations are routinized and institution-
alized may be as important in the long run as the search for market share and the
114 See , , .
115 Supra note 113.
116 This is the sanction the AF&PA retains in regard to SFI, but in order to suffer it a company must actually
refuse to apply the principles of the programme even to the extent of self-regulating. Retaining member-
ship does not require subscribing to third-party certification: SFI Audit Procedures and Qualifications,
Sect. 1, Scope, available at www.aboutsfb.org/generalPDFs/SFBStandard2005-2009.pdf.
117 See Sasser, supra note 61.
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risk of reputational attacks in enforcing certification standards, although it would
be unlikely to proceed without them.118
4 Preliminary Assessment
The system of global forestry regulation described in the preceding sections has been
built with remarkably little direct involvement by state or interstate administrative
agencies. Yet it operates a sophisticated, evolving and rapidly expanding set of admin-
istrative regulatory institutions. So similar are they to their better known state cous-
ins that they virtually cry out for assessment according to the received criteria of
administrative law. The analysis involved is not likely to be a one-way process, how-
ever. Although it is important to apply the received criteria of administrative law to
these emergent institutions, it is equally important to glean lessons from them that
can be taken back to the analysis of governmental administrative institutions.
Many criteria are regularly used to assess administrative institutions. Traditional
ones in American public law scholarship include accuracy, fairness, effectiveness,
efficiency, public acceptability and fidelity to law, as well as somewhat more concep-
tually intricate ones such as accountability, responsiveness, democracy and legiti-
macy. Most of these criteria are intertwined to some extent, seeming separable only at
a very abstract level, and can therefore be mixed and matched in various ways as
applied to empirical phenomena. The major questions about trans-governmental reg-
ulatory institutions to date seem to revolve around three basic issues: their effective-
ness, their accuracy or reliability, and their legitimacy, and the discussion below is
organized in terms of these. For reasons of theory explained below, however, the dis-
cussion of legitimacy is framed in terms of the criterion of accountability.
A Effectiveness
Much scholarly discussion of forest certification to date has concentrated on the ques-
tion of effectiveness. This discussion can be organized in terms of three main issues:
adoption, behavioural effects, and adaptability or learning capacity. Much of the
early analysis has focused on the preliminary question of adoption. Boiled down to its
essentials, the conventional wisdom has been that forest certification is unlikely to
work or to persist because it is unlikely to be widely adopted. The simplest version of
118 There are several perspectives in organization theory on why embedded routines persist. In general, see
DiMaggio and Powell, ‘ The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields’, 48 American Sociological Rev (1983) 147. For perspectives emphasizing the
importance of cultural understandings, see Zucker, ‘The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persist-
ence’, 42 American Sociological Rev (1977) 726, and also the classic by P. Berger and T. Luckman, The
Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (1966), esp. at 95–96. For interest-
based models, see, e.g., David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, 75 American Economic Rev (1985)
332 and Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, 94 American Political
Science Rev (2000) 251. For a recent synthesis see Colyvas and Powell, ‘Roads to Institutionalization’, in
B. Staw (ed.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 11/05, available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/
song/papers/colyvas_powell.pdf.
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this thesis has focused on the fact that there is notably little demand among retail
consumers for certified forest products (although it is slowly growing). What demand
exists becomes minuscule when willingness to pay is considered; very few retail con-
sumers seem willing to pay price premiums for certified forest products. And yet, for-
est certification is spreading rapidly, and engaging and structuring a growing share
of the world’s forestry industry. At this writing approximately seven per cent of the
world’s forests are certified through one programme or another, and the amount of
certified area continues to grow rapidly. The reasons for this growth remain widely
debated, but seem to boil down to a few primary factors that have already been dis-
cussed. The main driver has been the ability of environmental NGOs to pose risks to
markets in Europe and North America, and to leverage brand values to this end. But
as suggested above, this leverage seems to exist in part because of the widespread
acceptance of the values promoted by the certification movement, and because of the
inability of the governmental regulatory system to institute them.
More importantly, the spread of forest certification is having some effect on for-
estry practices. Most informed researchers seem to agree that forest certification is
having impacts both on the normative frameworks of the forestry world and on the
actual practices of forestry operations – not all of them, certainly, but a growing
proportion.119 These effects vary widely by country and region,120 and sometimes
are tangled up with other ongoing changes such as economic restructuring, but
there is a great deal of evidence that the adoption of certification programmes has
improved environmental and social practices in many parts of the world.121 More-
over, the process of establishing certification programmes has often had significant
effects on forest policy more generally.122 On the other hand, there is a growing
body of research indicating that both the adoption and effectiveness of forest certifi-
cation depend to a significant extent on the governmental regime operating in the
119 S. Bass et al. (eds), Certification’s Impacts on Forests, Stakeholders and Supply Chains, Report of the Interna-
tional Institute for Environment and Development (May 2001); Nussbaum and Simula, ‘Forest Certific-
aion: A Review of Impacts and Assessment Frameworks’, paper prepared for The Forest Dialogue
(2004), executive summary available at http://research.yale.edu/gisf/assets/pdf/tfd/certreview.pdf:
Cashore, Gale, Meidinger, and Newsom, supra note 63. Certification is disproportionately concentrated
in relatively developed countries, however, and has taken hold much more slowly in most developing
countries.
120 Ibid.
121 See, in addition, e.g., D. Newsom, V. Bahn, and B. Cashore, Does Forest Certification Matter? An Analysis of
Operation-Level Changes Required During the SmartWood Certification Process in the United States, manu-
script on file with author, 9 May 2005; Spillsbury, ‘The Sustainability of Forest Management: Assessing
the Impact of CIFOR Criteria and Indicators Research’, CIFOR Impact Assessment Papers No. 4 (2005),
available at www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BSpilsbury0503.pdf. For an arguably
self-interested, yet interesting, set of reports see WWF European Forest Programme, ‘The Effects of FSC
Certification in Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Russia, Sweden and the UK: An Analysis of Corrective Action
Requests Summary Report’, available at http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/europe/
where/uk/publications/index.cfm?uNewsID=18510, as well as the individual country reports linked to
the website.
122 E.g., Bass, ‘Certification in the Forest Political Landscape’, in Meidinger, Elliott, and Oesten, supra note 4,
at 27.
78 EJIL 17 (2006), 47–87 
locality. If governmental standards and enforcement are reasonably good in a given
jurisdiction, certification is more likely to be adopted and, at least if it is FSC certifica-
tion, is also likely to push management standards upward, in both the environmental
and social dimensions.123 Conversely, certification is more difficult to adopt and effec-
tuate in jurisdictions where government regulatory institutions are weak or corrupt.
Thus, importantly if not surprisingly, the capacity of forest certification to improve
forest management is tied to the general institutional context in which it operates.
This means that forest certification is not the ‘silver bullet’ for the worst cases of forest
destruction that some of its proponents may have hoped for, but it has made import-
ant contributions to stabilizing and improving forest management in many places. It
also means that an important next step for research will be to learn more about how
forest certification interacts with local community and state institutional structures,
and potentially to pinpoint key improvements that might be made in those structures
in tandem with a move to forest certification.
One of the most striking changes in the forestry regulatory system since the
appearance of forest certification has been its growing dynamism. Almost every-
where forest certification has come into play, it has spurred new debates about proper
forest management and at least some new mechanisms for testing and monitoring it.
Generally, as described above, the adoption of FSC certification has spurred establish-
ment of competing landowner and industry-based programmes, which in turn have
created a challenging and competitive environment for the FSC. Debate among and
within programmes is increasingly widespread, and the search for advantage intense.
Where one programme seems to have a weakness, a competing programme is likely
to quickly point it out and to try to provide an alternative. Of course, not all of the
claims and counterclaims are free of hyperbole or partial accuracy. But a considerable
amount of information about the functioning and problems of forestry appears to be
generated by the process. That information sometimes also involves or influences
government programmes, perhaps most often through small, incremental steps such
as changes in enforcement practices or interpretations of regulations, but sometimes
also through changes in formal requirements. While the overall system is too com-
plex and fluid to draw definite conclusions, there are preliminary grounds for believ-
ing that it is exhibiting a growing capacity for learning and adaptation, due in large
part to the competition among programmes and perhaps to a lesser degree to the
commitment to continuous improvement in management systems. The rapid flows of
information and broad multi-stakeholder dialogue and debate also appear to be valu-
able mechanisms of adaptation. Whether this will turn out as socially beneficial
learning, as opposed to opportunistic manoeuvring, remains to be seen. But it seems
clear that adaptive dynamics are important, given the great complexity and dyna-
mism of forest ecosystems and global markets, and our very limited understanding of
123 See Cashore, Gale, Meidinger, and Newsom, supra note 63; Ebeling, ‘Market-based Conservation and
Global Governance: Can Forest Certification Compensate for Poor Environmental Law Enforcement?
Insights from Ecuador and Bolivia’, thesis presented to the Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Artium in Political Science, June 2005.
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them. Thus, if a more adaptive forest regulatory system is indeed emerging, that is
likely to be a very important development for its overall capacity to achieve sustain-
able human–forest relationships.
This is not the place to expound on why traditional consumer-based economic mod-
els of regulatory institutions seem to come up short in the case of forest certification.
Indeed, it is not the place to develop a thoroughgoing explanation of the rise of forest
certification per se.124 But, in order to assess the implications of forest certification it is
necessary to offer at least a tentative theory of why it has been so effective thus far. The
most obvious way to do this is through a particular kind of legal institutional theory,
one which, unlike many functionalist institutional theories, accords a causal role to
normative vision and to political movements seeking to implement that vision. The
rise of forest certification was driven by social movement actors with a vision of, to put
it in a slightly grandiloquent way, ‘the just forest’. This is a forest in which basic eco-
logical functions are protected, workers and forest-dependent communities sustained,
and economic transactions with the world economy maintained over the long term. It
is the expansive vision of sustainable forest management discussed above.
This vision seems to have been influential for three basic reasons. First, its proponents
have framed it in a rhetorically powerful way. It is not easy to be against sustainable for-
estry, nor for the destruction of forest environments or communities. Moreover, the for-
est campaigners used the latent voice of potentially disapproving consumers to
translate it into market pressure in the form of risks to valuable brands. Second, propo-
nents have packaged this vision in conventional, widely acceptable standard-setting
and enforcement institutions that are commonplace and fairly easy to coordinate with
modern management organizations. Third, they have used existing power structures,
particularly global trading networks, to leverage those institutions into place. It is
important to stress, however, that they have been very careful in choosing their ene-
mies, and have tried to make peace with the global economy wherever possible. Func-
tional variables therefore also play a powerful role in explaining institutional adoption.
B Reliability
To say that a regulatory system is effective in shaping the objectives and behaviour of
economic actors is not necessarily to say that it is a form of good regulatory administra-
tion. Modern administrative systems are expected to make reliable decisions – meaning
impartial, accurate and consistent ones. Because these criteria are virtually impossible
to assess on their own terms in most real world situations, administrative law scholars
generally rely on institutional proxies to address them. Traditionally, these have
included the use of independent experts, the maintenance of official neutrality, and the
availability of review and appeals mechanisms. By these standards the forest certifica-
tion system as it exists today can be seen in either a positive or a negative light.
124 This effort is moving forward, however. For recent examples, see Bartley, supra note 62, Cashore, Auld,
and Newsom, supra note 19, and Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Busi-
ness and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules’, 18 Governance: An International Journal
of Policy, Administration, and Institutions (2005) 589.
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On the negative side, there is a major problem of competing certification pro-
grammes with inconsistent and contested standards. Thus, one certification mark is
not the equivalent of another and one certified forest product may have quite a differ-
ent environmental and social pedigree than another. But this is not necessarily an
insoluble obstacle to certification-based forestry governance, since the marks are dif-
ferent and information is fairly readily available on their meaning. Moreover, a gen-
eral understanding of the relative status of the marks could develop over time.
Even within certification programmes, however, there are reasons for concern.
While all of the programmes rely on experts, and there is no reason to think that the
experts are less intelligent or well educated than they would be if they worked for
state agencies, they are chosen and employed by the firms seeking certification,
rather than by a state agency. This has the advantage of removing the costs from the
public treasury, but involves real risks of certifier bias and inconsistency. The serious-
ness of this problem is difficult to gauge at present. Certification programmes seem
confident that it will not undermine their credibility. But the basis of their confidence
is unclear. To the degree that they are simply mimicking the practices of traditional
technical standard-setting programmes, they may be misguided. In most technical
certification processes problems of functionality are likely to emerge if sub-standard
products are certified. The poor work will thus be discovered and the party needing
certification is likely to find a different certifier. This is not the case for forest certifica-
tion; a wood product is likely to perform its function equally well whether it was pro-
duced through sustainable forest management or not.
On the other hand, the larger competitive and political dynamics of the forest certifica-
tion world may serve to reduce the risks of certifier bias somewhat or perhaps even con-
siderably. Many actors have interests in pointing out sub-standard certifications, and
indeed have done so quite loudly in a number of cases.125 The programmes also have
some internal review processes that will catch at least some problems, such as the FSC
auditing programme and the SFI ‘inconsistent practices’ reporting mechanism. There
are also other dispute resolution possibilities, but on the whole they are relatively limited
and difficult to pursue. The availability of these procedures seems likely to remain quite
limited, given the pressures on certification programmes to keep down costs.
C Accountability
Accountability has emerged as a central term in discussions of non-conventional reg-
ulatory institutions. There may not be a simple explanation for this development, but
125 E.g., Counsell and Terje Loraas, ‘Trading in Credibility: the Myth and Reality of the Forest Stewardship
Council’, Report of the Rainforest Foundation (2002), available at http://www.rainforestfounda-
tionuk.org/files/Trading%20in%20Credibility%20full%20report.pdf; Carrere, ‘Certifying the Uncertifia-
ble: FSC Certification of Tree Plantations in Thailand and Brazil’, Report of the World Rainforest Movement
(2003), available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/actors/FSC/text.pdf. These reports are both attacks on the
FSC policy for certifying forest plantations. Plantations policy is currently a major point of contention both
in the FSC and among environmentalists, many of whom argue that plantations are destructive monocul-
tures consistent only with destructive industrial forest practices, but a growing number of whom argue
that plantations are desirable ways of protecting natural forests, particularly in tropical regions.
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one possible cause is a growing discomfort with the term ‘legitimacy’. Legitimacy was
once a genealogical term for most legal (as opposed to socio-legal) scholars:126 admin-
istrative policy and decisions were legitimate if they could be traced to a properly
functioning organ of a state; states themselves were presumptively legitimate. Legal
scholars could thus concentrate on the practical business of how close the linkage of
administration to state policy should be and how it could be maintained. Legal schol-
ars have been open-minded enough to acknowledge that administrative regulation
without clear ties to state legitimacy might conceivably still be legitimate somehow,
but have not been prepared to carry the heavy normative load involved in making
that assessment. Hence the attractiveness of accountability. Accountability seems to
be a relatively open concept. An administrative system could possibly be accountable
to many different sources of authority, but at least it would be accountable.
And yet, the term accountability poses the same conundrums as legitimacy in the end.
One must answer the question, accountable to whom or what? And one must still make a
judgment about the validity of the source of authority. Indeed, the underlying principal-
agent connotations of the term may cause further problems by allowing the analyst too
easily to focus on and critique one or another source of accountability in isolation – NGOs
by themselves, for example, or industry associations by themselves – when in fact
accountability mechanisms are cumulative and interactive. This problem can be put off to
some extent by focusing on institutional proxies for accountability, two of which on the ex
ante side are transparency and participation mechanisms. These can be considered before
returning to the larger question of accountability in forest certification.
1 Transparency
All of the forest certification programmes embrace the value of transparency and
claim to be transparent. But their transparency remains limited, particularly in the
case of the industry programmes. On the whole, it focuses on rule-making rather
than adjudication and other forms of administrative decision-making. As noted
above, public information on certification inspections is limited, partly because much
of it is seen as confidential business information that, if made public, could injure the
competitive position of the firm. The FSC has always mandated more disclosure than
the industry programmes,127 but some of the industry programmes are also beginning
126 Most were never completely comfortable with the Weberian version of the concept – the ability of a legal
system to elicit compliance without using coercion even from those who disagreed with the rule involved:
M. Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology (ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, trans. E.
Fischoff et al., 1978, orig. 1922), at 31. For an illuminating analysis of the genealogical conception of legit-
imacy see E. Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State (2005), ch. 5.
127 The 2005 FSC General Assembly in Manaus, Brazil, approved a resolution for the development of guid-
ance on the participation of observers in forest management assessments and audits. The guidance is to
discuss criteria for selection and acceptance or rejection of observers, how they will be involved in the
certification process, confidentiality requirements, observer conduct, and costs: Amended Motion 14,
2005 General Assembly of the Forest Stewardship Council. This seems to move the FSC in the direction
of making observer access to certification inspections commonplace and routine. The motion was widely
supported, even by forest managers, evidently on the premise that it will contribute significantly to the
credibility of the programme.
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to provide more public information on inspections. This appears to be due largely to
emerging public procurement requirements in Europe, but these requirements them-
selves may reflect the practical power of the concept of transparency. If a significant
amount of information about a given practice is publicly available, then that practice
becomes potentially accountable to a broad set of actors and values, at least in that it
is subject to their criticism. The public has the capacity to withdraw its approval of
the practice. If criticism or public disapproval does not materialize, the practice may
become implicitly more legitimate.
On the other hand, the very rise of forest certification may also have been tied to a
desire to limit the transparency of forest management. Thus, one attraction of certi-
fication programmes to firms is that they implicitly provide cover for the firms.
Rather than having the public or nosy government inspectors intruding into their
operations, the firms hire certifiers to perform inspections and then to stand between
the firms and the public with a simple yes/no summary of findings. Of course, the
situation would be little better and probably worse with a government inspectorate.
Absent statutory directives, most inspectorates seem to treat information from
inspections as privileged in one way or another, and are loath to release it. The fact
that the amount of public information on certification inspections is increasing may
portend a general movement toward greater transparency in forestry regulation, but
this remains to be seen. The forestry world has a long history of fairly constrained
information flows, and there are continuing pressures to return to those ways. Trans-
parency in this field, therefore, remains a work in progress.
2 Participation
As Section 2 showed, the forest certification programmes are gradually expanding
their provisions for public participation. On the procedural side, largely driven by the
FSC model, they have all adopted at least minimal notice-and-comment proce-
dures.128 Yet as in government agencies, a great deal of decision-making can take
place before the notice process begins. Moreover, the comments may play only a
small role in determining the ultimate content of the rules.
More generally, forest certification programmes seem to be spurring an increase in
the overall amount of participatory governance activity in some societies. The
requirement that FSC certifiers conduct stakeholder consultations seems to have
stimulated the revitalization of community civic participation institutions in a
number of forest communities in developing and transitioning societies, and in some
cases to have opened up governmental decision-making processes.129 If the new PEFC
requirement is implemented in a serious way, it may have a similar effect. The very
process of creating certification programmes and regional or national standard-setting
processes has stimulated public policy discussions in many countries. Finally, the
128 Overdevest, ‘Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector: Constructing Markets for
Democracy?’, 59 Industrial Relations (2004) 172.
129 Tysiachniouk and Meidinger, ‘Using Forest Certification to Strengthen Rural Communities: Cases from
Northwest Russia’ (forthcoming); Cashore, Gale, Meidinger, and Newsom, supra note 63.
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establishment of a constellation of forest certification programmes has created a
larger participatory arena involving discussion and debate not only within pro-
grammes, but also among them, and in the broader arena of governments, environ-
mental NGOs, forestry enterprises, and local and indigenous communities. In sum,
the record of forest certification in facilitating both formal and informal public partici-
patory processes in forestry policy-making appears to be fairly strong.
The rise of forest certification has also aided a structural expansion in who partici-
pates in forest policy-making. The traditional world of forest policy was a relatively
closed system. In most countries government forestry agencies worked in close, com-
fortable relationships with foresters, landowners and the forest industry. Forest policy
generally reflected what these interests wanted, occasionally as modified by the
benign interventions of forestry researchers. The environmental movement brought
interlopers into the field. Their efforts to change state policies were typically resisted,
and their successes often limited to lawsuits setting aside legally indefensible forest
policies. It was not possible to bring such law suits in most countries. The FSC did
much to break open that closed structure by creating a parallel regulatory pro-
gramme and threatening the brands of companies who depend on global product
chains. The FSC was also able to draw upon ISO policies promoting broad stakeholder
involvement in private standard setting.
Whether the industry based programmes will ever evolve to the kind of full ‘bal-
anced’ participation of all stakeholders that the ISEAL guidelines envision is imposs-
ible to say at this time. But they have accepted in principle the need for broad
stakeholder participation and begun to put it into practice, albeit in a carefully con-
trolled way. It will not be easy for them to turn back.
3 Revisiting Accountability
To whom or to what is the global forest regulatory system, as manifested by forest certi-
fication, accountable? There is no single accountability structure in this system. Rather,
multiple, mutually reinforcing accountability structures are operating at three concep-
tual levels. First, organizationally, there are the competing certification programmes,
each seeking to demonstrate the capacity to certify proper forest management. These
are in turn accountable to constituents of various kinds, including members, forestry
operations, consumers, governments and public observers. Second, there is the over-
arching discourse of sustainable forest management to which they all profess alle-
giance. This discourse has several fixed elements, such as the requirement of sustained
yield, but it also encompasses considerable debate about other values. Third, the vari-
ous concepts of sustainability are embodied in the institutional structures described in
Sections 2 and 3. These include documented rule-making processes which increasingly
require reasoned responses to criticisms, structured adjudication by experts, increasing
visibility through public information and consultation requirements, and competition
in the market for forest certification, which is itself driven by a desire for public legiti-
macy. Like the discourse of sustainable forest management, these institutions seem to
have some fixed and relatively irreversible elements, while at the same time being open
to incremental revisions of various kinds.
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If the above is indeed a plausible outline of the accountability structure of forest
certification, the challenge is how to conceptualize it in a way that facilitates further
analysis and assessment. Its conceptual form is more synthetic and additive than the-
oretical and deductive, and its behavioural structure is both regular and creative.
There are several possible approaches to this problem. The first is to conceive the
accountability structure as the sum of its regulatory components. Colin Scott, for
example, suggests viewing accountability in a given regulatory domain as the other
side of the control structure. Since there are multiple control structures in many regu-
latory domains, there are multiple accountability structures.130 These are ‘spontane-
ous’ in the sense that they reflect the particular admixture of hierarchical authority,
market competition, and community or network control present in a given social
field.131 This approach has the considerable merit of recognizing the existence of
‘mixed’ modes of accountability and revealing the true complexity of many modern
accountability arrangements. But it faces the problem of reconciling the various
accountability structures, and explaining how they interact. Will they lead to over-
determined gridlocked relationships? If not, which ones will dominate, or how will
they accommodate each other? From Scott’s standpoint, these are empirical ques-
tions. Future research may indeed demonstrate a plethora of accountability struc-
tures built out of three or four basic control structures. It seems likely, however, that
there are common unifying institutional and normative tendencies across the various
regulatory fields, suggesting other dynamics at work than the modular interplay of
elemental control structures based on who gets to decide.132
One approach that partially shares this intuition is that of Grant and Keohane, who
categorize accountability mechanisms in terms of broader political structures based
on either participation of affected parties or delegation from power holders.133 Again,
however, accountability ends up being a question of who gets to decide. This
approach has the pragmatic benefit of tracing authority to either broad public con-
stituencies or specifically empowered actors. But it does not squarely encompass the
dynamic competition to define and implement normatively oriented structures that
are evident in the field of forestry regulation.
A second, more ‘traditional’ legal approach to accountability grows out of the ‘soft’
side of public law scholarship. Ultimately, it aims to assess the degree to which a regula-
tory system is true to its normative justifications. The immediate challenge is that
130 Scott, ‘Spontaneous Accountability’, in M.W. Dowdle (ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and
Experiences (2006, forthcoming).
131 Scott’s analytical categories are based largely on Robert Goodin’s distinctions among political, market,
and civil society accountability structures: Goodin, ‘Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of
the Third Sector’, 64 Archives of European Sociology (2003) 359. These in turn reflect the foundational
analytical traditions of Hobbes, Smith, and Rousseau. For a more diverse list of accountability mecha-
nisms, see also Freeman, ‘Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State’, 45 UCLA Law Review
(1997) 1.
132 The preliminary findings of the NYU IILJ Global Administrative Law project provide support for this
view. See www.iilj.org.
133 Grant and Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, 99 Am Political Science Rev
(2005) 1.
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concepts such as sustainable forest management and sustainable development contain
multiple normative justifications, and these may be somewhat at odds with each other
as discussed above. Nonetheless, even such multivalent concepts may distinguish a
domain in which actions are normatively supported from an area outside that domain
in which they are not. Perhaps more importantly, this approach accommodates the
normative elaboration and clarification that is evident in global forestry regulation.
The normative fidelity approach has more difficulty with processes that seem like
normative change rather than elaboration. If protection of indigenous rights, for
example, becomes a guiding norm for forestry when previously it was rejected and
ridiculed, the standard move in this tradition is to attribute the change to an authori-
tative decision-maker, and to treat the change as legitimate or not depending on the
status of that decision maker – that is, to flip back to the first mode of analysis
described above. In practice, however, the authority of decision-makers seems to be
quite contingent, and ever more so in the increasingly decentred regulatory system
described in this paper. Policy-makers’ authority, in other words, is often dependent on
their responsiveness to emergent norms and standards, rather than the reverse – hence
the decline and subsequent battle for re-establishment of traditional forestry authorities.
The normative fidelity approach to accountability does not seem to have developed a
persuasive account of this process, perhaps because it seeks to take norms as fixed refer-
ence points. A possibly important exception to this statement is the school of thought
that has developed around Jürgen Habermas. But this school seems to focus so heavily
on the internal rationality of normative dialogue as to miss the elements of competitive
institutionalization, applied testing, and political manoeuvring described above.134 If
these elements are important, it is necessary to look for a more complex model that
includes competitive, self-interested actors and partially standardized institutions.
A third approach to accountability is to view the package of actors, norms and
institutions as a larger system whose attributes are not reducible to the individual ele-
ments of the system. This is the approach that Charles Sabel and his colleagues are
developing.135 They describe multi-centred, mutually adjusting, yet also institutionalized
134 See, generally, J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: A Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (trans.
W. Rehg, 1996). Habermas offers his own elaborate analysis of the polarity between who gets to make a
decision and the normative justification of the decision in his distinction between ‘facticity’ (the positive
promulgation of rules by politically authorized law-makers) and ‘validity’ (the claim that law is legiti-
mate based on its rational acceptability which is in turn generated through non-instrumental dis-
course). For an effort in this direction that is much more attuned to the real world of modern regulatory
practice, see Black, ‘Regulatory Conversations’, 29 J Law and Society (2002) 163.
135 E.g., Cohen and Sabel, ‘Administrative Law and Global Politics: A Possibility for Democracy?’, 38 NYU J
Int’l L and Politics (2006, forthcoming); Dorf and Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’,
98 Columbia L Rev (1998) 267; Sabel, ‘Theory of a Real Time Revolution’ (manuscript on file with
author); Simon, ‘Toyota Jurisprudence’, in G. de Bùrca and J. Scott (eds), Law and New Governance In the
EU and the US (forthcoming). Sasha Courville has provided a description of how several of the individual
certification programmes affiliated with ISEAL have sought to institute learning structures and cultures,
and has also explored some of the tensions of the concept of a learning organization with concepts of
principle agent accountability: Courville, ‘Understanding NGO-Based Social and Environmental Regula-
tory Systems: Why We Need New Models of Accountability’, in Dowdle (ed.), supra note 130.
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structures as learning systems capable of evolving both new values and new solu-
tions, new goals and new strategies. This learning accountability perspective seems
to match up fairly well with the emerging global forestry regulatory system described
in this paper. The system seeks to clarify and sometimes modify policy goals in the
course of implementation. It relies heavily on applied normative arguments backed
up with reasons that are often based on practical experience. Certification pro-
grammes compete with each other by offering institutions that claim to efficiently
assess and ultimately to legitimate forest management, and to do so in a way that is
responsive to changing and sometimes only latent public values. To implement these
claims the certification programmes rely on institutionalized procedures that provide
public explanations for decisions as well as multiple (and multiplying) forums for pub-
lic criticism. The programmes and their allies also criticize each other in larger public
arenas, sometimes vehemently, while simultaneously recognizing a degree of mutual
dependence and participation in a common project. Thus, forest certification seems to
be instituting a continuing process of broad, cross-disciplinary, multi-interest
internal and external surveillance and review. This system has led to frequent
changes in substantive standards as well as rule-making and adjudication procedures
as described in Sections 2 and 3. For the time being, this process shows no signs of
slowing or stagnating.
While the above description seems to be an accurate empirical account of the forest
certification system, the underlying nature of the learning accountability system, if
indeed it is an accountability system, remains murky. At present it seems to be heav-
ily procedural, focusing on participation, public justification, transparency, mutual
monitoring and criticism, and competitive institutionalization. Yet the underlying
tone of the learning accountability school seems to be functionalist. These kinds of
experimental, open-ended, multi-centred, competitive regulatory systems seem to be
good for society in the view of proponents because they are the most effective mecha-
nisms for articulating its goals, testing them in practice, and revising them.
Ultimately, then, the argument is that that they are good for society as a whole.136
For now though, at least in this arena, the learning accountability model faces two
significant challenges. The first is the problem of distinguishing learning from drift
and opportunism. It may turn out that the emerging forestry regulatory system
shows significant progress in instituting environmental protection and sustainability –
but then again, it may not. It may simply provide a cover for long-term ineffectiveness
and increased profits for a few narrow interests.
The second problem is to develop a clearer articulation of exactly how these sys-
tems answer to society and further its interests. For now the argument appears to be
somewhat tautological. Learning regulatory systems answer to society because they
136 The concept of ‘society’ in forest certification remains contested. The founding understanding in the FSC
programme was expansive, essentially global, while also including local communities with particular
needs. The move to create stronger national programmes in the FSC, together with the centrality of
national programmes in the PEFC, may indicate a tendency to pull back toward conceiving the global
system as consisting of many ‘societies’, presumably national ones.
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are the best way of articulating and testing policies, and then disposing of outdated
ones and implementing revised ones. At present it is intellectually defensible to see
either an emerging functional learning accountability system or a gridlocked, disinte-
grating system of governmental accountability with nothing to replace it. It will be
impossible to say which perspective is more accurate without first trying hard to elu-
cidate the dynamics of an emergent accountability system. There are grounds for
thinking that a persuasive account can be produced. Real optimists might even hope
that the research process will contribute to the institutional criticism and eventual
improvement of that system.
